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The Unconstitutionality of State Insurance
Takeover Statutes: An Unfortunate But
Not Necessarily Final Result
John M. Sheffey*
The Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' to-
gether with the adoption by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission of Rule 14d-2,2 brought to a close the long-standing
debate over the constitutionality of "first generation" state
takeover laws.3 In Edgar the Court held that the Illinois Busi-
ness Take-Over Act was unconstitutional under the commerce
clause because the burden it imposed on interstate commerce
outweighed its putative local benefits.4 Although only a plural-
ity of the Court agreed that the Illinois statute also was invalid
because it was preempted by the Williams Act,5 the SEC's pro-
mulgation of Rule 14d-2 has created such a direct conflict with
the substantive provisions of the state takeover laws as to pre-
empt them under the supremacy clause.6 Edgar generated con-
siderable controversy regarding the continuing viability of state
efforts to regulate takeovers of general business corporations.7
This Article, however, focuses on whether and to what extent
Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkan-
sas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
3. "First generation" business takeover laws are those adopted prior to
Edgar, as opposed to "second generation" statutes, which were subsequently
enacted or amended in response to Edgar and Rule 14d-2.
4. 457 U.S. at 643-46; see infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. A plu-
rality of the Court held that the statute also was unconstitutional as a direct
regulation of commerce. 457 U.S. at 641-43.
5. 457 U.S. at 630-40; see infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
7. See Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE-
Standing Pat Blue Sky or Corporate Law Concepts, 7 CoRP. L. REV. 3 (1984);
Note, The Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24
B.C.L. REv. 1017 (1983); Note, Corporate Battles for Control-Edgar v. MITE
and the Constitutionality of State Takeover Legislation-The Continuing
Saga, 26 How. L.J. 1425 (1983); Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover
Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp, 1983 U. ILL L. REV. 457 (1983); Note,
Post-MITF_" The Constitutionality of State Takeover Acts, 40 WASH. & LE L.
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the analogous takeover provisions of state insurance holding
company acts survive these developments.
Like the more general state business takeover laws, state
acts regulating a holding company's ability to acquire control of
insurers are a relatively recent phenomenon. By the late
1960's, inflation, decline in underwriting profits, and strong
competition from the financial community led insurers to
either form or be acquired by holding companies.8 Through the
diversification permitted by such affiliations, insurers could en-
gage indirectly in activities prohibited by restrictive regulations
imposed on them as insurers.9 Concerned that excessive diver-
sion of insurance assets into unregulated activities would jeop-
ardize the insurers' solvency and the policyholders' security,' 0
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
adopted a model Insurance Holding Company System Regula-
tory Act in 1969.11 Most states have adopted insurance holding
company acts,12 usually patterning their bills after the Model
Act.13
REV. 1227 (1983); Comment, Edgar v. MITE Corp: Is the Pre-Emption of State
Takeover Statutes Complete?, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 415.
8. Seiler, Regulation of Upstream Holding Companies and Its Develop-
ment, 1969 AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION LEGAL SEC. PROC. 323, 324-25.
9. See REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE (D1) SuB.
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS ON
HOLDING COMPANY LEGISLATION, reprinted in I 1969 N.A.I.C. PROC. 175, 176-
77 [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMI'ITEE REPORT]; Barger, The
Insurance Holding Company: The Aftermath-Living with the Legislation,
1970 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 185, 186; Kemper, Insurance
Holding Companies: Economic and Management Factors, 1969 A.B.A. SEC.
INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 323, 324-27; Seiler, supra note 8, at 324-25;
Wolke, Curing the Cure-Insurance Holding Companies, 6 FORUM 95, 100-02
(1971); Wolke, Insurance Companies as Parents and Subsidiaries, 1970 A.B.A.
SEC. INS., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 166, 166-69 [hereinafter cited as Parents
and Subsidiaries].
10. Barger, supra note 9, at 186-87.
11. INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT-MODEL
LEGISLATION, reprinted in II 1969 N.A.I.C. PROC. 738 [hereinafter cited as
MODEL ACT]. A copy of § 3 of the Model Act, which governs acquisitions of
control of insurers, is included as an Appendix to this Article.
12. See Dew, The Insurance Holding Company Systems Regulatory Act-
What Does the Future Hold?, I 1983 N.A.I.C. PROC. 100, 100 (some variant of
Model Act adopted in 48 jurisdictions); Schwing, Insurance Holding Company
Regulatory Statutes and Related Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 27
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 96, 109 & n.52, 110 nn.54-55 (1976) (citing acquisition of
control provisions from 44 state statutes); Note, State Insurance Takeover Acts:
A Constitutional Analysis After Edgar v. MITE, 59 IND. L.J. 255, 261 & n.29
(1984) (42 states have enacted legislation governing acquisition of control of in-
surance companies).
13. Only Colorado, Montana, Pennsylvania, and New York enacted insur-
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The Model Act and state insurance holding company acts
place stringent requirements on holding companies attempting
to acquire control of insurers.' 4 These acquisition of control
provisions (hereinafter referred to as "insurance takeover stat-
utes") require holding companies seeking to gain control15 of a
domestic insurer, through either a tender offer or some other
agreement, to deliver a disclosure statement to the state insur-
ance commissioner and the insurer's stockholders and to re-
ceive the commissioner's approval of the acquisition before
ance holding company statutes before the NAIC Act was finalized. Schwing,
supra note 12, at 96 n.1; Seller, supra note 8, at 324-25.
14. The acquisition of control jrovisions are only one feature of typical in-
surance holding company legislation. See Seiler, supra note 8, at 341. Such
legislation also allows organization and acquisition of, and regulates insurers'
investments in and diversification through, subsidiaries, a practice known as
"downstream diversification." See e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 2; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-2002 (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 521A.2 (West Supp. 1984-1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-2-1102 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ti. 36, § 1652 (West
1976). Authorizing legislation was necessary to permit downstream diversifica-
tion because of statutory restrictions on insurers' ownership of stock of other
corporations. See, eg., ALA. CODE ANN. § 27-41-17 (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 175, § 193D (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-3-404 (1980).
Another feature of insurance holding company legislation is that it regu-
lates and limits transactions between the insurer and other members of the
holding company system. See MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 5. To avoid threats
to the security of policyholders, the state acts require careful monitoring of
dividends and other distributions by an insurer to an affiliate in the holding
company system and of other transactions between such affiliates and the in-
surer. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 21.22.080 (1984); MINN. STAT. § 60D.04 (1984);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 401-B:6 (1983); MI. GEN. LAWs § 27-35-4 (1979).
15. The Model Act defines "control" as follows:
The term "control" (including the terms "controlling", "controlled
by" and "under common control with") means the possession, direct
or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the man-
agement and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract other than a commercial contract for
goods or nonmanagement services, or otherwise, unless the power is
the result of an official position with or corporate office held by the
person. Control shall be presumed to exist if any person, directly or
indirectly, owns, controls, holds with the power to vote, or holds prox-
ies representing ten (10) percent or more of the voting securities of
any other person. This presumption may be rebutted by a showing
made in the manner provided by Section 4(i) that control does not ex-
ist in fact. The Commissioner may determine, after furnishing all
persons in interest notice and opportunity to be heard and making
specific findings of fact to support such determination, that control
exists in fact, notwithstanding the absence of a presumption to that
effect.
MODEL Acr, supra note 11, § 1(c). For state definitions of "control" patterned
after that in the Model Act, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-801(3)
(1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-23-1(c) (Burns 1983); MINN. STAT. § 60D.01(4)
(1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 382.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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making the offer or agreement. 16 The disclosure statement
must reveal the identity and background of the offeror, the
source, nature, and amount of the consideration to be offered,
audited financial statements, and the offeror's plans, if any, to
liquidate, merge, or otherwise materially change the insurer.17
The commissioner is authorized to hold a public hearing in
which any interested person can participate and to block the of-
fer or agreement if the commissioner finds, inter alia, that the
acquisition of control would be unfair or unreasonable to the
insurer's stockholders or policyholders or adverse to the public
interest.18
This Article explores the issue of whether, after the invali-
dation in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 19 of similar provisions of the Illi-
nois general business takeover statute and the promulgation of
Rule 14d-2(b), the present state insurance takeover statutes can
withstand a constitutional challenge. Part I examines the busi-
ness takeover statute found unconstitutional in Edgar and ex-
plains how the promulgation of Rule 14d-2(b) resolved some of
the constitutional questions left unanswered by that case. Part
II discusses the effect that Edgar and Rule 14d-2(b) have on ex-
isting state insurance takeover statutes and concludes that
these statutes are unconstitutional. Part III reviews the nega-
tive impact of this conclusion on policyholders. Finally, Part IV
examines the importance of the policyholder protection fea-
tures of the insurance statutes and proposes legislative amend-
ments designed to avoid the unfortunate consequences of their
invalidity.
I. STATE BUSINESS TAKEOVER LAWS AFTER EDGAR
AND RULE 14d-2(b)
All but one of the thirty-seven state takeover statutes in ef-
16. See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3; GA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-3
(1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 500.1311-.1316 (West 1983); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 692C.180 (1973).
17. The NAIC has promulgated model regulations to accompany the
Model Act, including Form A, the disclosure statement required in connection
with the acquisition of control of an insurer. See IIB 1970 N.A.I.C. PROC. 1055
(text of proposed regulations); I 1971 N.A.I.C. PRoc. 149 (reporting adoption of
regulations). For state provisions regarding required disclosure statements,
see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3304(b) (1981); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(2) (1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-7-6 (1978); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-29-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
18. See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3(d); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-
5005(d) (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 521A.3(4) (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT.
§ 60D.02(4) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-5A-9, -10 (1978).
19. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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fect at the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v.
MITE Corp. were enacted after the passage of the Williams Act
in 1968.20 Although there were individual variations, these stat-
utes typically required the party making the tender offer to
wait a period of time, often twenty days after the public an-
nouncement of the offer's material terms, before commencing
the offer.2 ' The statutes usually demanded that the offeror
comply with strict disclosure requirements22 and authorized the
corporations commissioner, secretary of state, or similar state
official to conduct a hearing to review the adequacy of the dis-
closures and, in many states, the merits and fairness of the
tender offer.23
In Edgar, the Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act,2 4 which was representative of such
takeover statutes, was unconstitutional under the commerce
clause. Only a plurality of the Court found that the state act
directly regulated commerce and thus was per se unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause.25 The majority, however,
found that the state act was unconstitutional because it imposed
a burden on interstate commerce that was excessive in relation
to the local interests it served.2
The Court determined that neither of the local interests
purportedly advanced by the state takeover statute, protection
of the target corporation's resident shareholders and regulation
of the internal affairs of domestic corporations,- justified the
burdens the statute imposed on interstate commerce. Although
the Court recognized that protection of resident shareholders
was a legitimate interest, this purpose did not justify the bur-
den the statute placed on nonresident shareholders.P The
20. Id at 631 n.6; Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 7 J. CORP. L.
603, 603 n.2 (1982).
21. See Note, supra note 20, at 606.
22. See id. at 607. These disclosure requirements frequently were broader
and demanded more detail than did the Williams Act. Id. at 609; see infra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
23. See Note, supra note 20, at 609.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
25. 457 U.S. at 641-43. Direct regulation of interstate commerce by a state
is itself a violation of the commerce clause. In contrast, indirect regulation of
interstate commerce is impermissible only when the burden imposed on inter-
state commerce exceeds the local benefits achieved by such regulation. Dow-
ling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. I- REv. 1, 6 (1940).
26. See 457 U.S. at 643-46 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US. 137,
142 (1970)).
27. Id. at 644.
28. I&
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Court noted that the protection of resident shareholders was
incomplete because the statute exempted a corporation's acqui-
sition of its own shares.29 Moreover, the Court doubted
whether the statute substantially enhanced the protection of Il-
linois shareholders since federal law contained many of the
statute's substantive protections.30 The Court also remained
unpersuaded by the asserted rationale that the state act was a
legitimate exercise of the state's power to regulate the internal
affairs of domestic corporations. Once again, the statute's reach
exceeded its purpose by applying not only when the target was
a domestic corporation, but also when Illinois residents held
ten percent of a foreign target's outstanding shares. Further,
the Court concluded that shareholder transfers of stock to
tender offerors simply did not implicate the target's internal
affairs.31
In addition,'a plurality of the Court 32 found that the Illi-
nois statute was preempted under the supremacy clause by the
Williams Act,33 a 1968 amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 designed to regulate cash tender offers for securi-
ties of certain corporations.3 The Williams Act requires a
tender offeror to distribute a detailed disclosure statement,35
gives each target shareholder a defined period in which to with-
draw the tendered shares,36 mandates that the offeror accept
shares tendered within ten days of the offer on a pro rata ba-
sis,37 stipulates that any increase in the consideration offered
during the tender offer be paid to shareholders tendering
before the increase,38 and prohibits fraud in the conduct of the
29. Id
30. I& at 644-45.
31. 1& at 645.
32. Id at 630-40.
33. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending Exchange Act §§ 12-
14, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
34. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
35. Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see Rule 14d-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1984).
36. Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). Under the
rules, a shareholder may withdraw tendered shares until 15 days after com-
mencement of the offer and, if the shares have not yet been purchased, within
60 days of the offer or 10 days after commencement of a competing offer. Rule
14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1984).
37. Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). The rules have
extended this privilege to all shares tendered during the offer. Rule 14d-8, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984).
38. 'Exchange Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
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tender offer.39
The Illinois statute, like most first generation state busi-
ness takeover laws,40 imposed more restrictive requirements on
the conduct of tender offers than did the Williams Act. The
statute required the offeror to notify the Secretary of State and
the target company of its intent to make an offer and of the of-
fer's material terms at least twenty days before commencing
the offer.41 During those twenty days, the statute forbade the
offeror from communicating with the target's shareholders.42
Further, it allowed any Illinois shareholders controlling ten
percent of the target corporation's outstanding stock to demand
a hearing before the Illinois Secretary of State43 and empow-
ered the Secretary to forbid the tender offer if the offer lacked
substantial fairness.44
Although the Edgar plurality noted that there was no con-
tention that an offeror could not comply with both the Illinois
statute and the Williams Act,45 it concluded, as have a number
of lower courts,46 that the state statute unconstitutionally hin-
39. Id. § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
40. See supra notes 3 & 20-23 and accompanying text.
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.54.B, .E (1979) (repealed 1983).
42. Id § 137.54.A.
43. See id. § 137.57.A.
44. Id. § 137.57.E.
45. 457 U.S. at 631-32. Because the events giving rise to the Edgar litiga-
tion occurred before the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), the conflict between
that rule and many state takeover statutes was not at issue. Id. at 636 n.11; see
infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
46. See e.g., Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580-81 (4th Cir. 1983); Na-
tional City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir. 1982);
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1980); Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1274-81 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds
sub non. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Bendix Corp. v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 525-29 (D. Md. 1982); Empire, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 903-04 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Natomnas Co. v. Bryan, 512
F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (D. Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 785-88
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,030-32 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980); Dart Indus.,
Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978); Esmark v. Strode, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,828, at 94,245-47 (Ky. Oct. 12,
1982); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 57-59, 302 N.W.2d 596, 598-99
(1981). For cases rejecting preemption challenges to state takeover statutes,
see, e.g., AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 933-38 (S.D. Ohio
1979); City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112, 115-16 (S.D. Ind. 1979);
Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP.
(CCH) 97,270, at 96,928-31 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1980); Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Whaland, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,303, at
91,900-02 (N.H. July 2, 1981). Some courts went even further than did the Ed-
gar plurality to find impermissible conflicts between the Williams Act and
1985]
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dered the execution and accomplishment of the objectives of
the Williams Act. The plurality reasoned that in enacting the
Williams Act Congress carefully balanced the interests of the
offeror and of the target's management in order to effectuate
the goal of investor protection.47 The Act permits both sides to
explain their position to the shareholders but prevents them
from exercising any undue advantage that could improperly in-
fluence the shareholders' ultimate decision. Under the plural-
ity's analysis, the provisions of the state takeover statute upset
this federally imposed neutrality. By requiring the offeror to
wait twenty days before contacting the target's shareholders,
the target's management was given a significant period of time
in which to persuade shareholders to reject the proposed of-
fer.48 Furthermore, the state statute's hearing provision im-
posed no deadline for completion or decision and thus gave a
management coalition holding ten percent of the target's out-
standing stock the invaluable weapon of delay.49 Finally, per-
mitting the Secretary of State to pass on the tender offer's
merits conflicted with the Act's "market approach," which al-
lowed shareholders to make their own decisions following
disclosure. 50
Although Edgar's resolution of the preemption issue is of
limited precedential value because it was only a plurality deci-
sion, most questions remaining after Edgar should have been
eliminated by the SEC's promulgation of Rule 14d-2(b) in late
1979.51 Rule 14d-2(b) requires the offeror to commence or with-
state provisions regarding the periods during which pro rata and withdrawal
rights attach, see Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1221-22 (D.N.J.
1981); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978), and the dis-
closure requirements with which tender offerors must comply, see Dart Indus.
v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 10-11 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
47. 457 U.S. at 632-34.
48. Id at 634-36.
49. Id at 636-39.
50. Id at 639-40.
51. See supra note 45. In the release announcing the adoption of the new
tender offer rules, the SEC explained the intended purpose of Rule 14d-2(b):
As discussed more fully in the February release, Rule 14d-2(b) is
intended to prevent public announcements by a bidder of the material
terms of its tender offer in advance of the offer's formal commence-
ment. The Commission believes that this practice is detrimental to
the interests of investors and results in many of the abuses the Wil-
liams Act was enacted to prevent. Such pre-commencement public
announcements cause security holders to make investment decisions
with respect to a tender offer on the basis of incomplete information
and trigger market activity normally attendant to a tender offer, such
as arbitrageur activity. Since they constitute the practical commence-
[Vol. 69:821
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draw the tender offer within five days of the public announce-
ment of its material terms.52 This requirement directly
conflicts with state provisions imposing a longer precommence-
ment waiting period following the offer's announcement.s3 The
Rule also conflicts with state takeover provisions requiring a
hearing and the approval by a state official before the com-
mencement of the offer.54 The official's hearing and decision
invariably will come long after the expiration of the Rule 14d-
2(b) five-day deadline. Consequently, Rule 14d-2(b) renders
compliance with these provisions of the state business takeover
statutes impossible and therefore requires preemption of the
state statutes under the supremacy clause,55 whatever their sta-
tus under the commerce clause.
ment of a tender offer, such pre-commencement public announce-
ments cause the contest for control of the subject company to occur
prior to the application of the Williams Act and therefore deny secur-
ity holders the protections which that Act was intended by Congress
to provide.
Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326, 70,329 (Nov. 29, 1979),
reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at
82,582-83 [hereinafter cited as Release No. 34-16,384]; see also Exchange Act
Release No. 15,548, 44 Fed. Reg. 9956, 9969-70 (Feb. 5, 1979), reprinted in (1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,227-28 (discussing
proposed Rule 14d-6, later renumbered as Rule 14d-2) [hereinafter cited as Re-
lease No. 34-15,548].
52. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
53. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130 (8th
Cir. 1982); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marly, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,246, at 91,618-19 (W.D. Okla. July 17,
1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Kennecott
Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1222 (D.N.J. 1981); Canadian Pac. Enters.,
Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192, 1196-97 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
54. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130 (8th
Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1222 (D.N.J. 1981); Re-
lease No. 34-16,384, supra note 51, at 70,329-30, reprinted in [1979-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,583-84. The offeror might
avoid that conflict by conditioning the offer upon completion of the hearing
and approval by the state regulator. See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying
text.
55. The argument also has been made that the detailed rules promulgated
by the Commission, when viewed together with the William Act, constitute a
pervasive regulatory scheme that implicitly preempts all state regulation of
the same transactions. See Note, The Effect of the New SEC Rules on the Con-
stitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URB. L REV. 913, 930-31
(1980).
1985]
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE INSURANCE
TAKEOVER STATUTES AFTER EDGAR AND
RULE 14d-2(b)
The acquisition of control provisions of most state insur-
ance statutes are materially similar to the provisions of the
state business takeover laws invalidated by Edgar and Rule 14d-
2(b). 56 Despite this similarity, one commentator has strained to
argue for upholding the validity of these statutes.5 7 The insur-
ance takeover statutes, however, may be unconstitutional under
the commerce clause for unduly regulating interstate com-
merce. Moreover, these statutes, like the state business take-
over laws, encroach on an area governed by the Williams Act
and Rule 14d-2(b) and are thereby preempted.
A. INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In the 1869 decision of Paul v. Virginia,58 the Supreme
Court held that insurance was not "commerce" within the
meaning of the commerce clause. For the next three-quarters
of a century, states regulated and taxed the insurance industry
free from commerce clause restraints. 59 In 1944, however, the
Court reversed the Paul decision, finding that insurance did in-
deed constitute "commerce" under the commerce clause.60 In
response to this reversal, Congress passed the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act,61 restoring the states' regulatory and taxing powers to
56. Compare supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (describing insur-
ance takeover statutes) with supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text
(describing business takeover statutes). Before Edgar, the constitutionality of
the insurance provisions was litigated with mixed results. Such provisions
were found valid in two decisions, see John Alden Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,617 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 1981);
Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,314 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 1980), and invalid in two
others, see Gunter v. Ago Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Mo. 1981), affd on other
grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
57. See Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers for Insurance Companies
After Edgar v. MITE, 51 FoRDHAM L. REV. 943 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Fordham Note]. But see Note, supra note 12 (arguing that insurance takeover
statutes are unconstitutional). There have been no reported decisions on this
question since Edgar.
58. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
59. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 414 (1946).
60. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944).
61. Pub. L. No. 15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1982)). The Act as codified provides in pertinent part:
§ 1011. Declaration of Policy
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their pre-1944 status.62
The McCarran-Ferguson Act embodies Congress's belief
that insurance is a "local matter to be subject to and regulated
by the several states."' 3 The Act removes all commerce clause
limitations on the states' power to regulate the "business of in-
surance."rA It further provides that state laws regulating the
"business of insurance" are preempted by a federal statute only
when the statute is expressly applicable to such business.6 5 The
McCarran-Ferguson Act consequently is a "reverse supremacy
clause,"66 under which state insurance laws can "preempt" fed-
eral statutes of general applicability.6
The seminal case on the relationship between state insur-
ance laws and federal securities law is SEC v. National Securi-
ties, Inc.6 8 In National Securities, the SEC alleged that two
insurers accomplished a merger through fraudulent, material
misrepresentations in violation of Rule 10b-5. 69 The defendants
asserted that the Arizona Director of Insurance had approved
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxa-
tion by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be con-
strued to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such
business by the several states.
§ 1012.
(a) State regulation
The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or su-
persede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance ... unless such act specifically relates to the
business of insurance: Provided, That... the Sherman Act and...
the Clayton Act, and.., the Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such busi-
ness is not regulated by State Law.
62. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1954).
63. HLR. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1945 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 670, 670-71.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1982); see Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1981); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408, 429-31 (1946).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(b) (1982).
66. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in Perspectiv 48 INs. CoUNs. J. 411, 425
(1981).
67. Belkin, State Regulation: Anachronism or Advantage, 29 FED. INS.
CouNs. Q. 209, 214 (1979); Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the
Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1093 (1962).
68. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
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the merger under the state's insurance law70 and that applica-
tion of federal securities law would violate the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act by superceding Arizona's insurance laws.71
In its analysis of the defendants' claim, the Supreme Court
in National Securities defined the "business of insurance"
shield of McCarran-Ferguson to include those state statutes
that regulate, directly or indirectly, the relationship between
insurers and their policyholders, including regulations promot-
ing insurer reliability.72 Thus, those provisions of the Arizona
merger statute that authorized the state Director of Insurance
70. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-731 (Supp. 1969) (amended 1974). The Ari-
zona merger law under which the Director acted was enacted prior to the in-
surance holding company acts in response to the 1964 amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act. 393 U.S. at 457 n.2; see infra note 195 and accompa-
nying text.
71. 393 U.S. at 457.
72. The Court explained:
The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy
which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation and enforce-
ment-these are the core of the "business of insurance." Undoubt-
edly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their
status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same
class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear
where the focus was-it was on the relationship between the insur-
ance company and the policyholder. Statutes aimed at protecting or
regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regulating
the "business of insurance."
Id. at 460.
Although this definition includes both a core and an outer layer of the
business of insurance, later Supreme Court decisions appear to limit the defi-
nition to its core. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co, v. Plreno, 458 U.S. 119,
127-29 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
210-18 (1979). These decisions, however, concerned federal antitrust chal-
lenges to insurance industry practices and should not be applied outside that
context. The antitrust exemption to the McCarran-Ferguson Act was moti-
vated not by the broad "federalist" purpose generally underlying the Act, but
rather by the limited judgment that price competition would cause insurer in-
solvencies and thus harm policyholders. Therefore, a different and narrower
interpretation of the "business of insurance" is justified in the antitrust con-
text. See Jacks, The Impact of Increased State Regulation of Insurance Merg-
ers and Acquisitions on Federal Antimerger Regulations, 27 DRAKE L. REV.
638, 642-44 (1977-1978); Note, The Definition of "Business of Insurance" Under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1480-84
(1980). Furthermore, the decisions applying a narrow definition of the "busi-
ness of insurance" did not implicate insurer reliability. Royal Drug involved
agreements between Blue Shield aid pharmacists limiting the cost of medica-
tion, 440 U.S. at 207, and Union Labor Life involved the evaluation by a pro-
fessional peer review committee of the necessity of chiropractic treatments
and the reasonableness of the fees charged for them, 458 U.S. at 123. The
cases thus are factually distinguishable and should not control in areas, such as
the regulation of insurance takeovers, in which reliability of the insurer truly
may hang in the balance.
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to block mergers that could substantially reduce the security of
and service to policyholders regulated the 'business of insur-
ance" because those provisions sought to protect the insurers'
policyholders.73 In contrast, those provisions protecting the in-
surers' stockholders fell outside McCarran-Ferguson's "business
of insurance" immunity.74
The broad definition in National Securities of state laws
regulating the "business of insurance" includes state laws regu-
lating acquisition of control of domestic insurers. The overrid-
ing purpose of insurance takeover statutes is the protection of
the insurer's policyholders. 75 Aware that insurers with highly
liquid assets are likely to become takeover targets of holding
companies in need of cash to finance unrelated activities,76 the
73. 393 U.S. at 460. The Court concluded, however, that McCarran-Fergu-
son would not bar the SEC action because the state law would not be invali-
dated, impaired, or superseded by the merger's reversal for fraud or
misrepresentation in securing shareholder approval. See id. at 462-63.
74. Id. at 460-61. National Securities has long been misinterpreted. A
vast majority of courts and commentators construe it to hold that state regula-
tion of insurance company mergers is not regulation of the "business of insur-
ance" within the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, eg., Commander Leasing Co.
v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77, 85 (10th Cir. 1973); American Gen-
eral Ins. Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887, 896-97 (S.D. Tex. 1973), affd on other
grounds, 496 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1974); Belkin, supra note 67, at 212; Kanwit,
The Federal Trade Commission and Insurance Mergers, 1980 INS. 1.4. 73, 75;
Lent, supra note 66, at 414; Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act The Need for Congressional'Action, 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 51, 53 (1979);
Smith, McCarran-Ferguson: A Perspective of Current Trends and Issues, 14
FORUM 1032, 1037 (1979). This interpretation focuses only on the first part of
the National Securities definition of the "business of insurance": the relation-
ship of the insurer and insured and the type, reliability, and interpretation of
the policy issued to the insured. See supra note 72. It ignores, however, the
perimeter of the definition. See Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins.
Co., 374 F. Supp. 564,.574 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In so doing, it fails to recognize that
insurance company mergers may have a profound effect on a company's status
as a reliable insurer and, therefore, that state regulation of such mergers may
be at least an indirect protection of the relationship between insured and in-
surer. See National Securities, 393 U.S. at 461-62. Perhaps more importantly,
the conclusion that mergers are invariably outside the business of insurance
completely ignores the holding in National Securities that a state statute that
regulates insurance. mergers with a view to policyholder protection "clearly re-
lates to the business of insurance." Id. at 462. This language unquestionably
undermines the notion that mergers are by definition excluded from the "busi-
ness of insurance."
75. See INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 178.
76. See 19 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLFMAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 10,433, at 325 (rev. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as J. APPLEtAN]; Kemper,
supra note 9, at 324-25; Kennedy, State Insurance Commissioner Involvement
in Takeovers of Insurers: An Overview of Procedures and Some Constitu-
tional Considerations, 17 FORuM 374, 375-76 (1981); Seiler, supra note 8, at 325;
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Model Act's drafters sought to protect the insurer's solvency
and the policyholders' security.77 This goal was implemented
through the two-pronged approach of regulating both acquisi-
tions of control of insurers78 and transactions between the in-
surer and its affiliates in the holding company system.79 By
requiring broad and detailed disclosures8 0 and conditioning the
commissioner's approval of the acquisition on the finding that it
would not be unfair and unreasonable to policyholders, 81 the
drafters demanded that the offeror demonstrate that its acqui-
Shaffer, Revised Memorandum on Issues and Problems Surrounding the NAIC
Model Insurance Holding Company Act, II 1982 N.A.I.C. PROC. 45, 49; Note,
The Insurance Holding Company Phenomenon and the Search for Regulatory
Controls, 56 VA. L. REV. 636, 641-42 (1970).
77. After listing several benefits of using the holding company arrange-
ment, the Industry Advisory Committee stated:
Thus, there are unquestionable and legitimate advantages that
can accrue for many insurers in these circumstances. These advan-
tages redound to the benefit of policyowners as insurers are able to
increase underwriting capacity through easier access to capital and to
provide a broader spectrum of services. Nonetheless, there should be
effective state supervision of insurers in their relationship with hold-
ing companies. Such supervision is a proper and natural extension of
the responsibility of state regulatory authority to assure, in the public
interest, the solvency of the insurer and the protection and fair treat-
ment of policyholders. Insurance is a business that is dependent com-
pletely on public confidence. Its contracts underwrite contingencies
that may be long deferred or promise payments to be made many
years in the future. Patronage of insurers is dependent upon the con-
fidence of the buyer that the insurer can and will discharge its obliga-
tions in the manner provided in its contract. Because of the
intangible nature of the insurance promise and its enormous signifi-
cance to the social and economic structure as well as to the parties of
the contract, the insurance business over many decades has developed
and maintained a philosophy and ethics and practices on a level far
above those that are generally accepted in the marketplace. Sound
regulation of the insurance business by the states has reinforced this
unique status of insurers and such regulation has been a principal bul-
wark of the public confidence that the business enjoys.
INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 9, at 178 (footnote omit-
ted). The Committee also noted: "The thrust of insurance department regula-
tion should be directed primarily to the maintenance of solvency of the
insurer, to the protection and fair treatment of policyholders and to the pre-
vention of activity that might adversely affect competition within the insur-
ance business." Id. at 181-82.
78. MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3.
79. Id. § 5. Section 5 requires that all material transactions between the
insurer and affilitates in the holding company system be fair and reasonable,
be properly recorded on the insurer's books and records, and leave the insurer
with adequate surplus. It also requires that all extraordinary dividends or dis-
tributions by insurers in holding company systems be submitted in advance to
the insurance commissioner for consideration.
80. MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3(a)-(e).
81. Id. § 3(d)(v).
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sition of control would not endanger the insurer's
policyholders.
Admittedly, policyholder protection is not the only goal of
the insurance takeover statutes; they also contain provisions
protecting the target insurer's shareholders.a2 The inclusion of
these provisions, however, is a product of the age in which they
were adopted. When the Model Act was passed, few general
business takeover laws existed to protect shareholder inter-
ests.83 The Act's drafters, therefore, probably included share-
holder protections only to compensate for this regulatory
neglect.84 In both the Model Act and the statutes patterned af-
ter it, the controlling objective clearly is policyholder rather
than shareholder protection.
The clearest indication that shareholder protection is not
the dominant concern of the insurance takeover statutes is
their limited applicability. The Model Act, for example, applies
only to those offers for, or attempts to acquire voting securities
of, a domestic insurer that could place the acquiring party in
control8s This limitation would not be present if the Act was
82. The Model Act provides, for example, that the offeror's disclosure
statement be sent to shareholders of the target insurer, see id. § 3(a), that
securityholders of the insurer receive notice of the public hearing, idt
§ 3(d)(2), and that the commissioner approve the offer only if it is not prejudi-
cial, unfair, or unreasonable to securityholders, id. § 3(d)(1)(iii), (iv). Other
provisions of the Model Act that do not refer specifically to securityholders
nevertheless are clearly designed to protect their interests. Included in this
category are the provisions requiring disclosure of any recommendations to
purchase the target stock made by the offeror within the 12 months before the
offer, id § 3(b)(9), and of any agreement between the offeror and a broker-
dealer concerning the solicitation of the target's stock, id. § 3(b)(11). See Ken-
nedy, supra note 76, at 385 (observing that, despite these examples of share-
holder protection, "the greater part of the NAIC Model Act seems clearly
designed to protect the interests of policyholders").
A proposal has been made to the NAIC to eliminate the provisions dealing
with shareholder protection in order to avoid conflict with federal and other
state laws. REPORT OF THE INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANIES (A2) SUBCOMMIT-
TEE, reprinted in 1 1981 N.A.I.C. PROc. 19L It suggests deletion of all the spe-
cific references to securityholders but retains other provisions, such as
§§ 3(b)(9) and (11), that, although clearly designed to protect securityholders,
do not expressly mention them. See id at 194-203 (proposed working draft of
amendment).
83. See Note, supra note 20, at 603 n.2.
84. Although the Williams Act was enacted in 1968, one year before the
Model Act's adoption, it did not cover tender offers for equity securities of in-
surance companies until the 1970 amendments. See Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-567, sec. 3, Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 84 Stat. 1497, 1497 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982)).
85. See MODEL ACr, supra note 1, § 3. State holding company acts gener-
ally are similar to the Model Act in this respect. See, eg., IDAHO CODE § 41-
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concerned primarily with protecting a target insurer's share-
holders. Even in situations in which the offer cannot result in a
transfer of control, tendering and nontendering shareholders
require the protections inherent in disclosure and antifraud
provisions to make an informed decision. Policyholders, how-
ever, need such protections only when the offer might result in
a transfer of control, since with control comes the power to di-
vert the insurer's assets and thereby threaten the policyholders'
security.
The absence in the insurance takeover statutes of provi-
sions relating to the conduct of the tender offer further con-
firms that they primarily are directed at securing policyholder
and not shareholder interests. The Model Act, unlike the Wil-
liams Act, does not include such common shareholder protec-
tions as permitting withdrawal by offerees,86 requiring pro rata
purchases in the event that the offer is oversubscribed,8 7 and
establishing minimum hold-open periods.8 8 Such protections
against unfairly conducted offers, however, would be helpful
only to shareholders, who otherwise might be coerced into a
premature tender decision. Since policyholders face no similar
threat, the general lack of such provisions in insurance take-
over statutes emphasizes their concern for protecting
policyholders.89
National Securities, therefore, stands for the proposition
that state insurance statutes enacted to protect policyholders
from the adverse consequences of certain business combina-
tions relate to the "business of insurance." Although National
3802 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-23-2 (Burns Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31-39-2 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3683 (1984). Pennsylvania is the
only exception, requiring advance regulatory approval not only for acquisitions
that result in a change of control but also for additional acquisitions by a 10%
beneficial owner. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 459.6(b) (1971 & Supp. 1984-
1985).
86. See Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); Rule 14d-7,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1984).
87. See Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); Rule 14d-8,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984).
88. See Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 2 40 .14e-l(a) (1984).
89. The unfairness of the offer to the target's shareholders is occasionally
cited as one of the reasons for administrative rejection of the acquisition. The
Connecticut Insurance Commissioner, for example, initially rejected the ITT-
Hartford merger in part because the merger favored the offeror's shareholders
over those of the target. The Commissioner's primary reason for disapproval,
however, was the possibility that the offeror would deplete the insurer's sur-
plus to finance other acquisitions. Note, supra note 76, at 658-60. Usually in-
surance regulators treat the issue of fairness to shareholders as ancillary to
the issue of fairness to policyholders. Dew, supra note 12, at 106.
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Securities involved a merger, there is no reason to restrict this
definition to mergers and exclude other forms of combinations
and acquisitions such as tender offers.90 As a result, the state
insurance takeover statutes fall within the National Securities
definition of "business of insurance" because of their emphasis
on policyholder protection,91 and the McCarran-Ferguson Act
therefore should remove all commerce clause barriers to their
constitutionality.92 If the McCarran-Ferguson Act is deemed
inapplicable to these statutes, however, the similarity of the
state insurance takeover statutes to the general business take-
over statute invalidated in Edgar suggests that they may en-
counter serious, though not necessarily insurmountable,
commerce clause challenges.
As noted earlier,93 a plurality in Edgar found a state busi-
ness takeover statute per se unconstitutional because it directly
regulated interstate commerce.9 State insurance takeover stat-
utes also would constitute direct regulation of interstate com-
merce under the plurality's analysis. Since both the general
business and insurance takeover statutes have essentially the
same scheme of regulation, including precommencement disclo-
sure, public hearing, and advance approval by an appropriate
state official, they are alike in their method of regulating inter-
state commerce. That the insurance takeover statutes have a
different purpose from that of their general business takeover
90. See Note, supra note 12, at 291-93. From the policyholders' standpoint,
it is virtually irrelevant whether transfer of control of their insurer is accom-
plished by merger, proxy contest, tender offer, or some other acquisition tech-
nique. In each of these situations, the crucial questions for the policyholders
are whether the insurer will continue to be reliable and whether the security
provided by their policies will be jeopardized by the acquisition.
91. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
92. See Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussell, 528 F. Supp. 391,
402 (D. Kan. 1981); John Alden Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, [1982 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,617, at 93,066 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 1981). But see
National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (W.D. Mo.
1981) (although certain portions of the Missouri Insurance Holding Company
Act are protected by McCarran-Ferguson, those regulating tender offers are
not), affd on other groun4N 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Sun Life Group, Inc.
v. Standard Life Ins. Co., [19794980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
% 97,314, at 97,118 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 1980) (insurance tender offers not within
the "business of insurance" subject to exclusive state regulation).
93. See supra note 25 and accompanying texL
94. See 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982); see also Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland Corporate Takeover Law
found unconstitutional because it violates the supremacy and commerce
clauses).
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counterparts is irrelevant in this context. 95 Consequently,
under the plurality's analysis, the insurance takeover statutes
probably would suffer the same fate as did the business take-
over statute invalidated in Edgar.
Even if the plurality approach is disregarded and the insur-
ance takeover statutes are found not to constitute a direct regu-
lation of commerce, the burden these statutes impose on
interstate commerce is comparable to that the Edgar majority
held required invalidation of the Illinois business takeover stat-
ute.96 Insurance statutes are inherently extraterritorial, with
one state effectively legislating for the entire nation.97 Enforce-
ment of such a statute can bar 98 or delay 99 a national multimil-
lion dollar transaction, thereby creating a substantial burden on
interstate commerce. An even more severe burden can result
from the application of several conflicting or inconsistent insur-
ance and general business takeover statutes to the same trans-
action. Such a scenario could occur when states in which a
target insurer transacts business apply their general business
takeover laws to tender offers for foreign corporations with suf-
ficient contacts with the state, 00 when a target insurance hold-
95. See Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1925) (statu-
tory purpose of state grain grading regulation does not excuse its direct burden
on interstate commerce).
96. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. Because the insurance
statutes presumably will apply to fewer transactions, they could be viewed as
imposing less severe burdens on interstate commerce than do the general busi-
ness takeover acts. See Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussell, 528 F.
Supp. 391, 402 (D. Kan. 1981). Nevertheless, the effect of the insurance stat-
utes on tender offers to which they apply is almost identical to that of the gen-
eral takeover statutes. In that sense, the burden of each on interstate
commerce is virtually indistinguishable.
97. See Tiger, The Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law: A Statute
Waiting to be Invalidated, 25 VILL. L. REv. 458, 470 (1980); Wilner & Landy,
The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1976).
98. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1284 (5th
Cir. 1978); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1224 (D.N.J. 1981);
Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
99. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Hi-
Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,804, at 90,033 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980). See generally Oldham, Regu-
lating the Regulators: Limitations upon a State's Ability to Regulate Corpora-
tions with Multistate Contacts, 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 181, 210-15 (1980) (discussing
delays and other burdens imposed on interstate commerce by state takeover
laws).
100. Fordham Note, supra note 57, at 951 & n.55. In this situation, the
takeover could be subject to the insurance holding company act and the gen-
eral business takeover statute of the insurer's domicile and to the laws of
other states with which the insurer has the requisite contacts. For this to oc-
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ing company has subsidiary insurers incorporated in different
states,1 1 or when a state insurance takeover statute applies to a
"commercially domiciled insurer" incorporated elsewhere. 10 2
An insurance holding company might even attempt to thwart
potential bidders by intentionally organizing subsidiaries in var-
ious states or by acquiring insurers incorporated in different
states, thereby triggering multiple state insurance takeover
laws.10 3
The Model Act's drafters indicated in an alternative provi-
sion their recognition of the dangers of multiple regulation: "It
is further declared that it is desirable to prevent unnecessary
multiple and conflicting regulation of insurers. Therefore, this
State shall exercise regulatory authority over domestic insurers
and, unless otherwise provided in this article, not over non-do-
mestic insurers, with respect to the matters contained
herein."''1 4 This declaration, however, does not avoid the possi-
bility of control by multiple states of a tender offer for the se-
curities of an insurer. The Model Act's acquisition of control
cur, of course, the applicable general business takeover statutes could not ex-
empt insurance acquisitions from their coverage.
101. See Silberman, Kezsbom & Sacks, Disputed Tender Offers in Regu-
lated Industries, 8 J. CoRP. L. 461, 466-69 (1983) (describing tender offer in
which the target insurance holding company had insurance subsidiaries incor-
porated in Iowa, Alabama, California, Florida, Michigan, and Oklahoma).
102. California, for example, applies its insurance holding company act to
insurers incorporated in the state and to "commercially domiciled insurers,"
defined as foreign insurers that, over the past three years, have written more
gross premiums in California than in their state of domicile, as long as such
California premiums constitute at least 20% of their gross premiums nation-
wide. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1215.13(a) (West Supp. 1985). Pennsylvania's act
applies to acquisitions of the stock of insurance companies or of insurance
holding companies that would make the purchaser a beneficial owner of 10%
of the outstanding stock, even if neither the holding company nor any of its
insurance subsidiaries are incorporated in Pennsylvania, if the tender offer is
extended to shareholders residing in the state. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 459.6(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 2L49-
1, § 18 (Vernon 1981) (applying Texas insurance law to Texas-licensed foreign
insurers domiciled in states not having insurance controls substantially similar
to those of Texas).
103. See Levi, The Contested Acquisition of an Insurance Company from
the Targets Point of View, 17 FoRUM 212, 218-19 (1981); Vinyard, Federal
Courts May Preempt State Takeover Laws 85 NAT'L UNDERWRrTER (LIFE &
HEALTH INS. ED.) 18, 22 (Dec. 5, 1981).
104. MODEL AcT, supra note 1, app. § 1(d); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3301(d) (1981) (adopting Model Act position regarding multiple regulation).
Texas adopted a similar provision but also provided that its holding company
act applied to any licensed foreign insurer if its state of domicile does not pro-
vide substantially similar regulation. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21A9-1,
§§ 1(d), 18 (Vernon 1981).
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section defines "domestic insurer" to include any person who
controls "a domestic insurer unless such other person is either
directly or through its affiliates primarily engaged in business
other than the business of insurance."1 0 5 Under this definition,
a party seeking to acquire control of an insurance holding com-
pany primarily engaged in the insurance business will face reg-
ulation in every state in which a subsidiary insurer is
organized.10 6
105. MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(a)(1). For similar state provisions, see
IOWA CODE ANN. § 521A.3(1) (West Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 382.040
(Vernon Supp. 1985); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 5(a)(2) (Vernon 1981).
In its 1980 amendments, the NAIC extended the scope of the Model Act to
acquisitions of nondomestic insurers that are authorized to do business in the
state. The amendments provide that if such an acquisition substantially les-
sens competition in any line of insurance in the state, the commissioner is em-
powered, after a hearing, to order the acquiring and/or acquired insurer to
cease and desist from doing business in the state or to deny either or both a
license to transact business in the state. NAIC MODEL ACQUISITION AND
MERGER LAW, reprinted in II 1980 N.A.I.C. PRoc. 42.
The NAIC asserts that the amendments do not promote multiple state
regulation of insurance acquisitions because the commissioner is not empow-
ered to prohibit the acquisition of foreign insurers, but only authorized to deny
the right to transact business in the state. NAIC MODEL ACQUISITION AND
MERGER LAW BACKGROUND STATEMENT BY TASK FORCE TO REVIEW THE
MODEL ACQUISITION AND MERGER REGULATION, reprinted in II 1980 N.A.I.C.
PROc. 30, 36-37. As a practical matter, however, an insurance acquisition may
be much less attractive if licenses to transact business in other states are
thereby jeopardized. Consequently, regardless of the NAIC's intent, these
amendments will have the effect of further delaying insurance acquisitions
and subjecting the participants to additional state proceedings. Despite its as-
sertions to the contrary, it seems that the NAIC in fact intended this result,
since the penalty for an acquisition with adverse competitive effects-the de-
nial of the right to transact further business in the state (which denial is lifted
if the acquisition is not consummated)-appears geared more toward deterring
acquisitions than promoting competition. It is difficult to understand how the
reduced competition resulting from an insurance acquisition is remedied by re-
moving additional insurers from the state. In any event, the increased burden
on interstate commerce created by these amendments is obvious. See Shaffer,
supra note 76, at 51-52. Illinois has adopted this amendment. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 73, § 743.12(a) (Supp. 1984-1985).
106. Such multiple regulation of one transaction has consistently been
cited as one of the suspect burdens on interstate commerce created by the
states' general business takeover laws. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,246, at
91,620 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981); Nathan & Moloney, State Tender Offer Stat-
utes: An Analysis of the Practical and Policy Considerations, 23 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 647, 652 (1978); Oldham, supra note 99, at 247; Subcommittee on Proxy
Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities Com-
mittee, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 188-89
(1976); Tiger, supra note 97, at 481-82; Wilner & Landy, supra note 97, at 20-21.
The inconsistent multiple regulation of various state takeover statutes has
been called the "anarchy and commercial warfare" and the "clog upon the mo-
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The insurance takeover statutes thus impose a significant
burden on interstate commerce. The insurance statutes are un-
constitutional under the commerce clause, however, only if that
burden is clearly excessive in comparison to the local benefits
of the statutes.10 7 Unlike the asserted benefits of the business
takeover statutes in Edgar, which the Supreme Court found to
be either weak or only tangentially served by the statute, °s the
benefits of the insurance statutes are not easily dismissed.
The predominant purpose of insurance takeover laws, as
reflected in their terms and history, is protection of policyhold-
ers.109 Such a purpose has long been recognized as a legitimate,
indeed a paramount, objective of state insurance laws gener-
ally." 0 Entrusted with the funds of others for proper adminis-
tration, insurers, like other financial intermediaries, are
bility of commerce" that the commerce clause was designed to avoid. Silber-
man, Kezsbom & Sacks, supra note 101, at 470 & n.63. See generally HLP.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (founders desired to
federalize the regulation of foreign and interstate commerce through the com-
merce clause); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (states
may not clog the mobility of commerce by creating economic barriers to the
products of other states).
Coordination among the various insurance commissioners who may exer-
cise jurisdiction in connection with a particular tender offer, perhaps even
with some deferring to the findings and conclusions of another, could ease the
regulatory burden. Although this already may have occurred to a limited ex-
tent, see Levi, supra note 103, at 219, it will be difficult to accomplish on a
broad scale. Not only are there important differences among state laws, see
Dew, supra note 12, at 106, but insurance commissioners, like other regulators,
often are jealous of their regulatory prerogatives. Unfortunately, the threat of
multiple regulation has not been significantly diminished by the possibility of
cooperation among the states, and the commercial burden, therefore, remains.
107. The interstate commerce argument presents something of a "Catch
22" for state regulation of tender offers. If one state's statute regulates on a
nationwide basis, it is said to be extraterritorial and thus imposes a heavy bur-
den on interstate commerce. If, on the other hand, each state regulates only
within its own borders, then a nationwide tender offer is subject to multiple
regulation that also creates impermissible burdens for interstate commerce.
108. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
110. The protection of policyholders and, in a broader sense, the public
generally traditionally has been the primary motivation of insurance regula-
tion and has been implemented through financial regulation to preserve sol-
vency and trade practice regulation to avoid overreaching by insurers. See
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); R. KEETON, BASIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 8.3, at 554-55
(1971); E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 2-3 (2d ed. 1957); Kim-
ball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the The-
ory of Insurance Law, 45 MiNN. L. REv. 471, 477-78 (1961); Kinder, An
Overview of State Insurance Regulation, BEST'S REV. (PROPERTY/CASuALTY
INS. ED.) 14, 14, 16 (July 1979).
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invested with a public trust.' Because policyholders cannot
oversee the administration of their premium dollars, state regu-
latory authorities have assumed the responsibility of safeguard-
ing insurance assets needed to pay policyholder claims.
The limited extraterritorial impact of the state insurance
takeover statutes is, unfortunately, a necessary evil. Although
states easily can regulate both domestic and foreign insurers
with respect to such matters as rates and sales practices,112 reg-
ulations intended to preserve the insurer's solvency and finan-
cial stability would be impractical and inefficient if imposed on
an overlapping state-by-state basis. Multiple and conflicting
regulation concerning the maintenance of acceptable invest-
ments, for example, ultimately would require the insurer to
maintain separate assets for the premium funds derived from
each state. As recognized by the Model Act and most state in-
surance takeover laws, the logical recipient of regulatory power
over such matters is the insurer's domiciliary state.1 3 The
domiciliary state is likely to have the greatest contacts with the
insurer, and it, unlike other states, has granted and can revoke
the insurer's charter."14 Although the domiciliary state's regu-
lations are extraterritorial in the sense that they affect both
resident and nonresident policyholders, this extended reach
does not adversely affect the policyholders. Regardless of their
residency, all policyholders have an interest in the same pool of
111. 19 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 76, § 10,321, at 3-4; 2A G. COUCH, CoUcH
ON INSURANCE 2D, § 21:1, at 218 (rev. ed. 1984); W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF INSURANCE § 5, at 36 (3d ed. 1951).
112. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1029, 1065.2, 1065.18-3 (Smith-Hurd
1966 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. § 72A.02 (1984); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2302,
2402(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 901, 1002, 1202(1)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-9-3, 27-29-2(a) (1979); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.19.010, 48.30.010 (1984).
113. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. In addition, the domicil-
iary state has traditionally exercised control over the insurer's maintenance of
acceptable investments. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 736, 785 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. § 60A.11 (1984); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1402 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1601 (West 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 27-11.1-6 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.13.010 (1984). New York,
however, also conditions the right of foreign insurers to transact business in
the state on compliance with many of its financial regulations. See, e.g., N.Y.
INS. LAW § 1308 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (New York's limitation on credit for
reinsurance, which extends to foreign insurers). Other states with similar pro-
visions limit their scope to domestic insurers. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 785 (Smith-Hurd 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.12.160 (1984).
114. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-56, -94 (1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 403, 1101 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. INS. LAW § 108 (McKinney Supp. 1984);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-1-14 (Supp. 1984).
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insurer assets subject to the regulation." 5
Moreover, the state insurance takeover statutes genuinely
promote the protection of policyholders. The detailed disclo-
sure requirements of these laws" 6 seek to assure that the ac-
quisition of control, if successful, will not jeopardize the
insurer's financial stability. Requiring disclosure of the of-
feror's identityn 7 allows examination of its expertise in manag-
ing an insurer and its reputation or possible motivation for
diverting the insurer's assets. Likewise, disclosure of the
source of consideration n s can indicate that the insurer's assets
may be necessary to repay a loan, and financial statements" 9
can suggest that such assets are needed to satisfy the offeror's
own financial obligations. By requiring the offeror to reveal
any plans to merge, liquidate, or otherwise materially change
the insurer, 20 the laws attempt to anticipate transformations of
the insurer that could harm existing policyholders financially.
Finally, the insurance takeover statutes do not rely solely on
full disclosure to protect policyholders; they also grant the state
insurance commissioner veto power over the takeover if the
commissioner finds it unfair, unreasonable, or prejudicial to the
policyholders.32 1
115. The Supreme Court has recognized this phenomenon:
Individual policyholders living in many different states who own poli-
cies in a single company have their separate interests blended in one
assembled fund of assets upon which all are equally dependent for
payment of their policies. The decisions which that company makes
at its home office-the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, the
investments it makes, the losses it pays--concern not just the people
of the state where the home office happens to be located. They con-
cern people living far beyond the boundaries of that state.
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 541-42 (1944).
116. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3(b)(1); ALA. CODE § 27-29-
3(b)(1) (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2003(b)(1) (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWs
§ 500.1312(a) (1983); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(2)(1) (1984); OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, § 1653(b)(1) (West Supp. 1984).
118. See, ag., MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(b)(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-481.03(A)(4) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-3(b)(2) (1982); MINN. STAT.
§ 60D.02(2)(2) (1984); R.L GEN. LAws § 27-35-2(b)(2) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31-39-2(2)(b) (Supp. 1983).
119. See, ag., MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3(b)(3); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-39b(b)(3) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-23-2(b)(5) (Burns
Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(2)(3) (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-2-
1104(2)(c) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-29-70(3) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
120. See, e.g., MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(b)(4); ALASKA STAT.
§ 2L22.020(4) (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 743.5(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(2)(4) (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-7-6(A)(4)
(1978); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 5(c)(4) (Vernon 1981).
12L See, ag., MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(d)(1); ARc. STAT. ANN. § 66-
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Thus, the insurance takeover statutes, unlike the unconsti-
tutional business takeover statutes, are drawn to effectuate a
legitimate purpose and succeed in substantially furthering that
purpose.122 The statutes neither undermine their protective
function 123 nor duplicate protections already embodied in fed-
eral law. 124 Therefore, if the insurance statutes are deemed to
regulate interstate commerce only indirectly, they would be
constitutional under the commerce clause, even if the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act is inapplicable, because the benefit of en-
hanced policyholder protection outweighs the burden the
statutes impose on interstate commerce. 125 Invalidation of the
5005(d)(1) (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 521A.3(4)(a) (West Supp. 1984); MINN.
STAT. § 60D.02(4)(1) (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-5A-9 (1978); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3683(f)(1) (1984).
122. Several commentators note that the legitimate interests served by the
insurance legislatioA are stronger than those advanced by state business take-
over laws. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 76, at 385; Profusek & Gompf, supra note
7, at 22-23; Fordham Note, supra note 57, at 955-57.
123. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court held that the Illinois Business
Take-Over Act's extension to nonresident shareholders and exemption of
tender offers by the issuer undermined the Act's purported justification of
protecting resident shareholders. See 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). Like the Illinois
Act, the Model Act exempts from its coverage the insurer's tender offer for its
own shares. See MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(a). This exemption, however,
does not undermine the Act's interest in protecting the insurer's policyholders.
Because the insurance statutes cover not all tender offers, but only those that
result in a change of control over a domestic insurer, see MODEL ACT, supra
note 11, app. § 1(c)(2), offers by insurers for their own shares are not covered
because they merely consolidate rather than change control. The exemption
of such offers is therefore consistent with the overall regulatory pattern.
124. The Court in Edgar doubted whether the Illinois Act could apprecia-
bly further its purpose of shareholder protection when federal law already
provided such protection. See 457 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1982); see also Telvest, Inc.
v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580-81 (4th Cir. 1983) (discounting significance of
local benefits of Virginia business takeover law when benefits already pro-
vided by Williams Act). The rationale of minimizing duplication, however, is
not present for the policyholder protections provided by state insurance take-
over laws, which have no direct analogue in federal law. See infra notes 166-
83 and accompanying text.
125. An argument can be made, however, that the benefits promoted by
the statutes could be, and often are, promoted by means less burdensome on
interstate commerce. For example, policyholder protection is already provided
by insurance laws regulating transactions between the insurer and its affili-
ates, the adequacy of an insurer's surplus, and the insurer's extraordinary divi-
dends and distributions. See, e.g., MODEL ACT, supra note 11, §§ 5(a), (b), (c);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-13-5(a)(1), (a)(2), (b) (1982); IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 521A.5.1, .2, .3 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. §§ 60D.04(1), (2), (3) (1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-7-23, -24, -25 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-39-4(1), (2),
(3) (1974). In addition, policyholders are protected by statutes prohibiting de-
ceptive practices by, and fraudulent operations of, an insurer. See, e.g., Na-
tional Gity Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911-12 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
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statutes by the Williams Act and Rule 14d-2(b), however, can-
not be so easily avoided.
B. PREEMPTION
Unlike the commerce clause analysis of the insurance take-
over statutes, analysis of the statutes'. preemption under the
Williams Act and Rule 14d-2(b) is unaffected by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. By adoption of McCarran-Ferguson, Congress
did not relinquish its power to legislate in, and thus preempt,
an area covered by state insurance regulation. It merely indi-
cated that its silence would not bar state regulation of insur-
ance, 26 providing that no congressional enactment would
preempt a state's regulation of insurance "unless such Act spe-
cifically relates to the business of insurance."'2' Consequently,
the Williams Act and Rule 14d-2(b) can preempt state insur-
ance statutes only if the Act specifically relates to the "business
of insurance."
The Williams Act does contain a specific and express refer-
ence to insurance company securities:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,... to
make a tender offer for... any class of any equity security which is
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or any equity security of
an insurance company which would have been required to be so reg-
istered except for the exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of
this title .... 128
(discussing provisions of Missouri Insurance Holding Company Act), affd on
other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982). The insurance takeover statutes
would be unconstitutional under the commerce clause if their protections
could be promoted by less restrictive means. See generally Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (state cannot discriminate against in-
terstate commerce if the legitimate local interest can be protected by less re-
strictive alternatives). Since the less restrictive means would be inadequate to
effectuate the goal of policyholder protection, see infra notes 180-83 and ac-
companying text, however, the state statutes are constitutional under the com-
merce clause as long as the local benefits outweigh the incidental burden on
interstate commerce.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982).
127. Id. § 1012(b). The federal law is deemed to "specifically relate" to the
business of insurance only if it contains an express indication to that effect.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946); Spirt v. Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). A mere failure
to exempt insurance from an act's scope is not a sufficiently express reference
to bypass McCarran-Ferguson. Cochran v. Pace, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 464 (5th
Cir. 1979).
128. Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982) (emphasis ad-
ded). The same reference to insurance company securities appears in the sec-
tion governing disclosure requirements for 5% beneficial owners. Id.
§ 13(il)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
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Although this language indicates the intent of Congress to in-
clude tender offers for insurance companies within the Act's
coverage, in John Alden Life Insurance Co. v. Woods,129 a fed-
eral district court held that the language did not overcome the
McCarran-Ferguson barrier. The court reasoned that a federal
law must either expressly declare that it preempts state insur-
ance law or contain the words "business of insurance" before it
will be held to supersede state insurance law.130 The court fur-
ther stated that the Williams Act deals only with the regulation
of securities and, as such, does not relate to the business of
insurance.1 31
The John Alden court's conclusion that preemption results
only if the federal statute contains certain specified words goes
well beyond the terms of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Con-
gress's promise in the Act is simply that it will "speak out" if it
intends a federal statute passed under the commerce clause to
apply to the business of insurance. 132 The reference in the Wil-
liams Act to insurance company equity securities is an explicit
statement of congressional intent to regulate tender offers for
target insurers. Moreover, the court's suggestion that this regu-
lation of tender offers does not relate to the "business of insur-
ance" conflicts with its conclusion earlier in the opinion that
state insurance takeover statutes do regulate the business of in-
surance.133 The inescapable conclusion is that the Williams Act
specifically refers to the "business of insurance," making the
McCarran-Ferguson protections inapplicable.13
Without the protection of the McCarron-Ferguson Act, the
state insurance takeover laws will be preempted if they unduly
conflict with the terms or policies of the Williams Act and the
rules promulgated thereunder. The clearest such conflict is
created by Rule 14d-2(b), which requires that an offer be com-
129. [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,617 (D. Idaho
Dec. 19, 1981).
130. Id& at 93,066.
131. Id.
132. See Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 468, 483 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980).
133. John Alden, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 93,064-
65.
134. See Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,314, at 97,117-18 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 1980)
("Section 14d . . .refers expressly by its terms to insurance companies. As a
result, the McCarran-Ferguson Act. . .is inapplicable by its terms."). But see
Shaffer, supra note 76, at 58 (characterizing the analysis from John Alden as
"a powerful argument based upon the express congressional mandate in Mc-
Carran-Ferguson").
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menced within five days of the announcement of its material
terms.135 In contrast, the insurance statutes generally prohibit
the offer's commencement until approved by the insurance
commissioner 36 and require that the approval come only after
a public hearing.1' 7 An offeror cannot comply literally with
both Rule 14d-2(b) and these provisions.13s The commence-
ment of the offer will, without exception, be delayed beyond
five days by the state hearing and approval requirements. 13
Moreover, the resulting delay frustrates the Rule's purpose of
forcing prompt dissemination of information after the offer's
first public announcement, which dissemination is intended to
avoid precipitating significant market activity that could impel
public investors to make immediate and uninformed
decisions.' 40
In Sun Life Group, Inc. v. Standard Life Insurance Co., 141
another federal district court attempted to avoid this conflict by
allowing an offer to commence in accordance with Rule 14d-
2(b) as long as it was conditioned on state regulatory approval
following the necessary hearing.14 The court found that such
harmonization of state and federal law served the public inter-
est because it encouraged, rather than hindered, the dissemina-
tion of information to the target's shareholders.143 In an
interpretative release, the Securities and Exchange Commission
staff approved of this "conditional offer" approach. 44
135. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
136. See MODEL ACr, supra note 11, § 3(a).
137. See id. § 3(d)(1); infra note 146.
138. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D.
Mo. 1981), affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Shaffer, supra
note 76, at 50-5L
139. The hearing provisions of the Model Act also may conflict with, and
therefore be preempted by, Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.IR § 240.14d-7 (1984), which au-
thorizes the offeror to purchase tendered shares as soon as 15 business days
after commencement of the offer. See Shaffer, supra note 76, at 52-54.
140. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1980); Re-
lease No. 34-16,384, supra note 51, at 70,329-36, reprinted in [1979-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,373, at 82,583-84.
141. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,314 (S.D.
Ind. Mar. 12, 1980).
142. Id. at 97,117.
143. Id. at 97,118.
144. The staff answered "yes" to the question: "Can a bidder's acceptance
for payment of securities tendered in response to a tender offer be conditioned
upon the obtaining of a state or federal regulatory approval?" Exchange Act
Release No. 16,623 (March 5, 1980), reprinted in 544 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) G-1 (1980). This release has been relied on as authority for the condi-
tional offer approach to avoid conflicts between Rule 14d-2(b) and state busi-
19851
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Although the Sun Life result is appealing, its analysis fails
to avoid the direct conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and the state
provisions. Many state insurance takeover statutes do not per-
mit the conditional offer contemplated by Sun Life. The Model
Act, for example, states in its barest essentials:
No person... shall make a tender offer for. . . any voting security
of a domestic insurer . . . unless, at the time any such offer . . . is
made .... such person has filed with the Commissioner and has sent
to such insurer ... a statement containing the information required
by this section and such offer. . . has been approved by the Commis-
sioner in the manner hereinafter prescribed.
1 4 5
This provision unambiguously requires that the offeror must al-
ready have filed its disclosure statement and received the com-
missioner's posthearing approval at the time it makes the
offer.146 An offer made in advance of the commissioner's ap-
ness takeover statutes. See Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover
Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 710
(1981); Comment, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 7 J. CORP. L. 603, 617-18
(1982); see also Release No. 34-16,384, supra note 51, at 70,330, reprinted in
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 82,373, at 82,584 (recog-
nizing that regulatory approvals may be required before bidder is allowed to
purchase shares).
In an amicus curiae memorandum submitted to the court in Sun Life,
however, the Commission suggested that the waiting and hearing provisions of
the Indiana Insurance Holding Company Act were not deemed to have a "se-
vere, adverse impact on the operation of the Williams Act, assuming an expe-
ditious hearing and resolution of the relevant issues." See Kennedy, supra
note 76, at 385 n.73 (quoting Brief for SEC, amicus curiae, at 5 n.5, Sun Life).
Taken together, these various pronouncements by the Commission suggest
that, although such conditional offers are not inconsistent with Rule 14d-2(b),
conflicts remain between the state insurance hearing provisions and the other
purposes and objectives of the Williams Act. See infra notes 151-64 and ac-
companying text.
145. MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(a). Most state insurance holding com-
pany acts contain comparable provisions. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-
5005(a) (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 521A.3(1) (West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 500.1311(1) (West 1983); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(1) (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 692C.180(2) (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1653(a) (West
Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-5A-3 (1978). For examples of state
provisions that are materially different, see infra note 148.
146. The wording of the Model Act has created some doubt concerning
whether a hearing must be held in all cases. Section 3(d)(1) states, in relevant
part, that "[t]he Commissioner shall approve any . .. acquisition . .. unless,
after a public hearing thereon, he finds that" one of six enumerated disqualifi-
cations apply. MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(d)(1). Many states have copied
this somewhat ambiguous provision verbatim from the Model Act. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-803(5) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-3(f)(1) (1982);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3304(d)(1) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-7-7 (1978);
R.I. GEN. LAws. § 27-35-2(d)(1) (1979). This provision could be interpreted to
require a hearing only if the transaction is not approved and to allow the in-
surance commissioner to approve without a hearing. The intent of the draft-
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proval violates the straightforward language of the Model
Act. 47 Therefore, any statute that includes this provision of
the Model Act cannot be saved from direct conflict with Rule
14d-2(b) by conditional offers.148
ers, however, was to require a public hearing in all cases. See Seller, supra
note 8, at 345. But see REPORT ON POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO THE NAIC
MODEL INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT, reprinted
in 1978 NA-I.C. PRoc. 220, 222 (hearing is optional with the commissioner).
This interpretive problem does not arise in the states that unambiguously re-
quire a hearing in all cases, see e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-48L07(A)(1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-39d(a) (West Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-23-2(d)(1) (Burns Supp. 1984), specify that a hearing is required only
when the commissioner disapproves the transaction, see, eg., IDAHO CODE § 41-
3805(1) (Supp. 1984), make a hearing optional, see, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT.
§ 743.8(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984), or require no hearing at all, see, eg., MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 494(e) (1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2108 (1984).
147. One commentator has noted that permission for such conditional of-
fers "may require a contortion of the state statute if it follows the wording of
the NAIC Model Act." Kennedy, supra note 76, at 385 (footnote omitted).
Moreover, using this tactic to avoid conflict with Rule 14d-2(b) would not work
under most state takeover laws applicable to general business corporations.
See e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (D.N.J. 1981)
("Neither the legislative history nor the past administration of the New Jersey
Takeover Law supports a construction of the statute that would permit a hear-
ing... after a tender offer has commenced."). The New York takeover stat-
ute, however, was amended to authorize the attorney general to prohibit a
bidder from purchasing or paying for shares, but not from disseminating the
offer or receiving tenders, pending a hearing or investigation. Act of June 30,
1980, ch. 733, sec. 2, § 1605(a), 1980 N.Y. Laws 1869, 1869 (codified at N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1605(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985)); see Shapiro, State Takeover
Laws, 12 ANN. INST. SEc. REG. 401, 418 (PLI Corp. L & Prac. Course Hand-
book Series, no. 348) (1980).
148. The Florida act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 628.461 (West 1984), has been in-
terpreted to require that "the Department of Insurance... approve the pro-
posed offer before any form of tender offer can be made to security holders."
Gunter v. Ago Int'l, 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981). That an offer could
not be made in advance of commissioner approval was clearly stated in earlier
drafts of the Model Act: "Until all requirements of this section have been
complied with no person shall make a tender offer for.., any voting security
of a domestic insurer ... ." DRAFt NAIC HOLDING COMPANY BILL § 4, 11969
N.A.I.C. PRoc. 200, 202.
For an example of a state insurance takeover statute that, instead of fol-
lowing the Model Act in this respect, specifically provides for such conditional
offers, see ALA. CODE 27-29-3(a)(2) (1977). Laws of several other states also
deviate from the Model Act and can be interpreted as permitting, although not
expressly authorizing, conditional offers. For example, some statutes prohibit
the acquisition of control, but not the offer for control, in advance of regula-
tory approval. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.22.030(b) (1984); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 20-48L07(A) (1975); CAL. INS. CODE § 1215.2(d) (West Supp. 1984); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:731 (West 1978); N.Y. INS. LAW § 69-e (McKinney Supp.
1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-10-204 (1980); VA. CODE § 38.1-178.1 (1980). The
insurance laws of Idaho also could be interpreted similarly. See IDAHO CODE
§§ 41-3805(1), -3802(1) (Supp. 1984) (prohibiting tender offers prior to filing
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Moreover, the conditional offer rationale would avoid con-
flict with Rule 14d-2(b) only when the offer is, in fact, condi-
tional. Most offerors for control of insurers probably will
attempt to escape burdensome state requirements by precipitat-
ing a conflict through the use of unconditional offers. In such
situations, the insurance regulator and target might assert that
the offeror's ability to make a conditional offer removes the im-
possibility of compliance with both federal and state law149 and
that the offeror should be estopped from asserting preemption
because it voluntarily rejected a course that could accommodate
both. A court, however, should dismiss this argument and look
only to the facts before it, not to those that could have ex-
isted.150 If the offeror's making an unconditional offer is per-
missible under federal law, that a different course of action
could have satisfied state law as well is irrelevant.
Even when state law permits conditional offers in order to
avoid conflict with federal law, preemption problems remain.
A hearing that delays completion of the tender offer and substi-
tutes the decision of the insurance commissioner for that of the
target's shareholders frustrates the underlying objectives of the
Williams Act regardless of whether it is conducted before or
during the offer.151 These state law provisions give manage-
ment time to employ various defensive maneuvers to combat
with the director, thereby implying that conditional offers can be made after
filing).
149. Impossibility of compliance with state and federal law is grounds for
preemption of the former. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
150. In Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F. 2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980), an offeror
chose not to make the limited public announcement permitted by state law
that would have avoided triggering the five-day deadline of Rule 14d-2(b). The
court nevertheless refused to consider what the outcome would have been had
the offer not precipitated the state-federal conflict:
Thus, the "safe harbor" provision [of state law] does not obviate the
constitutional problem posed here. The issue in this preemption case
is whether the impact of the New Jersey law on the course actually
pursued by [the offeror]-an action it was entitled to take under fed-
eral law---conflicted with the Williams Act and SEC regulations. Pre-
emption analysis focuses on whether the State law serves as an
obstacle to the operation of federal law "in the circumstances of this
particular case," rather than in all cases or in a hypothetical case.
Id. at 188 (quoting Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977)).
151. Delay in consummation of a tender offer is as powerful a management
tool as is delay in commencement of the offer. See, e.g., National City Lines,
Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1215 (D.N.J. 1981). Moreover, one author has sug-
gested that if the scope of the hearing extends to the substantive fairness of
the offer rather than merely the adequacy of disclosure, the conditional
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the offer, including bringing in a "white knight," arranging a
defensive merger, and issuing additional shares.' 52 If such tac-
tics are successful, the offer will be defeated before the share-
holders have a chance to consider it. Furthermore, although
the Model Act requires that the hearing commence within
thirty days of the offeror's filing of its disclosure statement and
that the commissioner render a decision within thirty days of
the hearing's conclusion, the Act places no limit on the dura-
tion of the hearing1 s3  Most statutes permit management to
maximize this delay by allowing the target corporation, as well
as other interested persons, to participate in and prolong the
hearing by presenting evidence, examining and cross-examining
witnesses, and offering oral and written arguments.' 5 4 The Act
also allows the target to appeal an adverse decision by the com-
missioner, which may involve a trial de novo.ls s
purchase rationale will not save the state law. See Comment, supra note 144,
at 617-18.
152. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 636-39 (1982); see also
Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 238 (1977) (describing the importance of
time to the target's management); Wacthell, Special Tender Offer Litigation
Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437-42 (1977) (describing specific tactics). Delay
also provides time for the operation of normal market forces. Thus, the offer
may become economically less dersirable for shareholders as the market price
of the target's securities approaches the offering price, and such an increase in
the market price is likely if the offering price is disclosed. Wilner & Landy,
supra note 97, at 10.
153. Model Act, supra note 11, § 3(d)(2). For comparable state statutes, see
D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2003(d)(2) (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWs cl. 175, § 193m(d)(2)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 382.060(3) (Vernon Supp. 1985);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-29-90(2) (Law. Co-op. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 3683(f)(2) (1984). Some states permit considerably greater delay in securing
the commissioner's decision. For example, many states require the hearing to
commence within 60 days after filing, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 73, § 743.8(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(4)(2) (1984); W. VA. CODE
§ 33-27-3(d)(2) (1982); Connecticut requires the hearing to commence within
180 days and places no deadline on the commissioner to reach a decision,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-39d(a) (West Supp. 1984); and Kansas simply di-
rects that the hearing commence "as soon as practicable" but places no time
limit on either commencement of the hearing or announcement of the com-
missioner's decision, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3304 (1981).
154. See MODEL Aar, supra note 11, § 3(d); see also Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (D.N.J. 1981) (discussing the target's opportu-
nity under state law to participate in the hearing and the impermissible delay
created by such hearing); Parents and Subsidiaries, supra note 9, at 180 (giv-
ing specific advice on how to prolong the hearing and delay the offer).
155. See Model Act, supra note 11, § 13; Vinyard, supra note 103, at 22. For
comparable state provisions, see ALA. CODE § 27-29-13 (1977); MINN. STAT.
§ 60D.12 (1984); NEv. REV. STAT. § 692C.490 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 401-B:14(I) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-29-360(a) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
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The indefinite delay in the consummation of the offer
caused by these provisions immeasurably increases manage-
ment's ability to repulse the offer. This advantage defeats the
Williams Act's balance of neutrality between the offeror and
the target management 5 6 by allowing management a greater
opportunity to sway the shareholders' decision.' 57 Since this
delay has the same effect whether it occurs before or during
the offer, this interference with federal law cannot be avoided
by a conditional offer. The hearing provisions are therefore
preempted by the supremacy clause regardless of any condi-
tions that may be placed on the offer.
The disclosure provisions of the state insurance takeover
statutes also raise preemption problems. Because the Model
Act's disclosure requirements were drawn primarily for the
protection of policyholders rather than shareholders, 58 it is not
surprising that they call for some information not required
under the Williams Act.' 59 Despite this difference in the pur-
poses of the insurance statutes and the Williams Act, however,
courts have cited the burdens imposed on the offeror by such
supplementary disclosure requirements as a ground for invali-
156. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-34 (1982). The House In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce Committee report on the Williams Act re-
flects this goal of neutrality:
It was urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not be
discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check
on entrenched but inefficient management. It was also recognized
that these bids are made for many other reasons, and do not always
reflect a desire to improve the management of the company. The bill
avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at
the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportu-
nity to fairly present their case.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2811, 2813 (emphasis added).
157. See National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Mo.
1981), affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982). Courts have struck
down hearing provisions in state business takeover statutes precisely because
of the effect of this delay on the neutrality of the Williams Act. See, e.g., Ben-
dix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Md. 1982); Crane
Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 784-85 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
507 F. Supp. 1206, 1217-18 (D.N.J. 1981).
158. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
159. See Shaffer, supra note 76, at 54-55 (giving some specific examples of
the differences). Compare MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(b) and Form A, IIB
1970 N.A.I.C. PRoc. 1060 (Model Act disclosure requirements) with Exchange
Act, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982) and Schedule 14D-1, Rule 14d-100, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1984) (Williams Act disclosure requirements).
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dating insurance takeover statutes, 160 just as they have done
with respect to general business takeover statutes.' 6 '
Finally, the state insurance laws and the Williams Act dif-
fer regarding who determines the success of the offer. The Wil-
liams Act embodies a "market approach," the objective of
which is to provide the target shareholders with necessary in-
formation but to allow them to decide for themselves whether
to tender.162 By vesting a state official with the power to decide
whether the offer can proceed, the state statutes instead adopt
a "benevolent bureaucracy" approach, under which the state of-
ficial, rather than the individual investor, can determine the
fate of the offer.'63 This shift of power hinders the accomplish-
ment of the Williams Act's objectives and thus invalidates the
approval provisions of state insurance takeover statutes.164
160. See Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Na-
tional City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 9U (W.D. Mo. 1981) (in-
surance takeover statute unconstitutional), affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (insurance takeover statute inapplicable to transaction at
issue).
One student commentator disputes this result, but her arguments are not
persuasive. See Fordham Note, supra note 57. First, she argues that the Wil-
liams Act is only a minimum disclosure statute and that it does not require the
proper amount of disclosure. Id. at 966. The authorities, however, do not sup-
port her conclusion. See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d
1122, 1132 (8th Cir. 1982); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,
1280-81 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 V.S. 173 (1979). Second, she states that additional disclo-
sures are justifiable in view of the statutory objective of policyholder protec-
tion. Fordham Note, supra note 57, at 966. That the state statutes have a
different purpose, however, does not eliminate their conflict with the opera-
tion of federal law. Finally, she states that the additional disclosures are pro-
vided to the insurance commissioner who has the expertise necessary to
comprehend them. Id. This overlooks the Model Act requirement that the
target insurance company distribute those same disclosures to its shareholders,
thereby potentially confusing the same investors the Williams Act sought to
protect from excessive disclosures. See MODEL AcT, supra note 31, § 3(a).
161. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, U31-32 (8th
Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1221 (D.N.J. 1981);
Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978); E. ARANOW, H.
EINHoWN & G. BERSrEiN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERs FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 228 (1977); Tiger, supra note 97, at 470-71.
162. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1977); Kenne-
cott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-78 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub.
nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
163. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980), affd sub
nom Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Camp-
bell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SFc L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,036-37
(D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980).
164. See Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Na-
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Since no part of the typical insurance takeover statute can
stand without the hearing, disclosure, and commissioner ap-
proval provisions, the unconstitutionality of these provisions
causes the entire statute to fall.165 Although the Williams Act
will continue to protect the target insurer's shareholders, inval-
idation of the state insurance takeover statutes leaves unpro-
tected a class of individuals for whom the states have long
assumed the duty of protection-the insurer's policyholders.
tional City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Mo. 1981),
affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennedy, supra note 76,
at 384; Shaffer, supra note 76, at 54. The incompatibility of such hearing re-
quirements with the Williams Act also has been cited as a reason for invalidat-
ing general business takeover statutes. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 639-40 (1982) (plurality opinion); National City Lines v. LLC Corp.,
687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp.
1206, 1220 (D.N.J. 1981); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,804, at 90,038 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980); Es-
mark, Inc. v. Strode, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,828,
at 94,246 (Ky. Oct. 12, 1982); Sargent, supra note 144, at 719-20. Although both
types usually are invalidated, a hearing that extends to the substantive fair-
ness of the offer is even more offensive to the market approach than is one
limited to determining compliance with the disclosure requirements. See Na-
tional City Lines, 687 F.2d at 1131; Esmark, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) at 94,246; Sargent, supra note 144, at 720. The hearing man-
dated by the Model Act clearly falls within the first category. See MODEL ACT,
supra note 11, § 3(d)(1)(v).
In Fordham Note, supra note 57, the author argues that the insurance
statutes do not substitute the insurance commissioner's judgment for the In-
vestor's judgment because the commissioner is in fact acting in the interests of
policyholders. Id at 964-65. This contention, however, ignores the simple fact
that an adverse decision by the commissioner precludes shareholders from ac-
cepting the offer to the same extent as do similar provisions in the state busi-
ness takeover statutes.
165. Theinsurance takeover provisions, however, are only part of the hold-
ing company acts. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Arguably, invali-
dation of these acquisition of control sections does not affect the Model Act's
other sections, including those relating to subsidiaries, MODEL ACT, supra note
11, § 2, the registration of insurers, id. § 4, and transactions with affiliates, id.
§ 5(a). To survive, these sections must be severable from the acquisition of
control sections. Whether a provision is severable depends on whether the leg-
islature would have passed the remaining provisions alone. In making this de-
termination, courts look to whether the remaining portions are independent of
the invalid sections, are capable of separate enforcement, form a complete act,
and are reasonable when standing alone. 2 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 44.03, at 338 (4th ed. 1973) (revision of SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION). The remaining sections of most state holding
company acts seem to meet these tests and therefore survive the invalidation
of the acquisition of control sections.
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IlL THE POLICYHOLDER AS THE UNINTENDED
VICTIM OF THE INVALIDATION OF STATE
INSURANCE TAKEOVER STATUTES
The invalidation of state insurance takeover statutes leaves
the Williams Act as the principal control over tender offers for
insurers. Unlike the insurance laws,16 however, the Williams
Act does not purport to protect the insurer's policyholders; the
Act's sole purpose is to protect the target's shareholders.16
Following the demise of the insurance takeover laws, therefore,
the most vulnerable party in an insurance takeover will be left
without a regulatory guardian.
The legislative history of the Williams Act confirms that
Congress's primary purpose in passing the Act was to fill the
regulatory gap that left shareholders who were confronted with
a cash tender offer without the protections available in proxy
contests, exchange offers, and other acquisition vehicles.' To
this end, the Williams Act requires the offeror to inform the
shareholders of all facts relevant to their decision whether to
tender. 69 The SEC, in fashioning rules for the implementation
of the Williams Act, has remained loyal to this overarching
purpose of investor protection.170 The supposed "secondary"
goal of the Williams Act, neutrality between the offeror and in-
cumbent management, actually is merely one of the means of
achieving shareholder protection. For a shareholder to make
an informed decision in a hostile tender offer, the shareholder
must hear the conflicting positions of the offeror and manage-
ment. The shareholder receives the necessary information only
when the governing legislation strikes a balance of neutrality
between the opposing parties and allows neither to preclude
the other from communicating its message to the
shareholders. 171
166. See supra notes 75-89 & 109-121 and accompanying text.
167. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
168. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comnm on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 19 (1967)
(statement of Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2811, 2813-14; 114 CONG. REc. 21,481 (1968)
(statement of Rep. Moss); 113 CONG. REc. 24,662 (1967) (statement of Sen.
Williams).
169. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Release No. 34-16,384, supra note 51 (adoption of new
tender offer rules); Release No. 34-15,548, supra note 51 (proposing same).
171. See Bunch, Edgar v. MITE Corporation: A Proposed Analysis, 17
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Because of the Williams Act's single-minded purpose, the
invalidation of the first generation business takeover statutes
had only a minimal substantive impact. These state statutes, af-
ter all, also sought to promote shareholder protection.1 72 As a
result, the objective of the state statutes was not abandoned,
but merely achieved under other regulations. The insurance
takeover statutes, however, seek primarily to protect the target
insurer's policyholders. 1 73 This goal requires a far different
regulatory scheme than that necessary for shareholder protec-
tion. Consequently, the substantive impact of the invalidation
of the insurance takeover statutes is enormous and, for the in-
surer's policyholders, entirely negative.
Protection of policyholders cannot be achieved under the
Williams Act. Consistent with its underlying rationale, the Wil-
liams Act is grounded on the theory that a shareholder can
make an informed decision between contestants if given ade-
quate and nonfraudulent disclosures. The Act furthers its mar-
ket approach by taking a neutral position with respect to the
tender offer contestants, permitting the shareholder to make
the ultimate decision. This position represents the antithesis to
the Model Act's theory of substantive merit regulation, under
which a state official unilaterally can bar the transaction if the
official determines that it is "unfair and unreasonable.' 1 74 Un-
fortunately, policyholder protection cannot be achieved by the
disclosure model of the Williams Act.175 Disclosure is an effec-
tive tool only if the individual who receives the information can
act on it. Consequently, disclosure to policyholders would be
futile because they are powerless to accept or reject the propo-
sal.176 To protect the policyholders, therefore, the power to de-
TULSA L.J. 229, 241 (1981); McCauliff, Federalism and the Constitutionality of
State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. REV. 295, 303 (1981); Sargent, supra note
144, at 714-15; Note, 'The Validity of State Tender Offer Statutes: SEC Rule
14d-2(b) and Post-Kidwell Federal Decisions, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1025,
1052-53 (1981); Comment, State Regulation of Tender Offers: How Much is
Constitutional? 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 667 (1981).
172. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1982) (state's justifica-
tion of takeover act); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 11, § 3(d)(1)(iv). Similar standards
frequently are set forth in state securities statutes for the review of new offer-
ings by the securities commissioner. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,140 (West 1977)
(suspension of qualification if issuance is "not fair, just, or equitable"); R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 105-06 (5th ed. 1982) (noting sub-
stantive review under state "blue sky" laws).
175. See supra notes 33-39 & 159 and accompanying text.
176. This futility is evident in the Model Act's requirement of disclosure to
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termine the outcome of the transaction necessarily must be
vested in a third party.
The target's shareholders, of course, have the power to de-
termine the success or failure of the offer. The shareholders,
however, cannot be expected to decide whether to tender their
shares based on the needs of the insurer's policyholders. Un-
like tendering shareholders, policyholders will retain their rela-
tionship with the target even after a successful tender offer and
therefore are concerned with the effect of the transaction on
their future security. In stark contrast, the primary concern of
the shareholders is whether the offered price is fair and pro-
vides a sufficient premium over the market price. As with
their initial decision to invest, the shareholders' decision to
tender will be based on their own economic self-interest.17
Any expectation that shareholders will look out for policy-
holders in making their decision whether to tender their
shares, therefore, is unrealistic. To the extent that sharehold-
ers consider disclosures relevant to the offer's future impact on
the insurer,178 the consideration is probably motivated by the
shareholders' interest in the adequacy of the price offered. If
an individual shareholder suspects that a successful offer will
adversely affect the insurer, for example, the shareholder
might tender to avoid retaining an interest in the insurer after
the shareholders, but not to the policyholders, of the target insurer. See
MODEL Ac, supra note 11, § 3(a). Disclosures to policyholders could serve the
limited function of enabling them to make an informed decision on whether to
change insurers following a successful tender offer. Even for this narrow pur-
pose, however, the disclosures would be largely ineffective. Those insureds
holding whole life policies or who no longer are insurable may not have the
option of changing insurers. Moreover, requiring policyholders to make the
"investment decision" of remaining with or changing their insurer would be a
novel concept and would demand a level of sophistication that is unrealistic to
expect from most policyholders. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying
text
177. Former SEC Chairman Williams recognized that, under the market
approach, the success or failure of the offer depends only on the price paid for
the target's shares. McCauliff, supra note 171, at 311. One of the policies of
the Williams Act is to preserve the shareholders' right to determine their own
economic self-interest. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1218
(D.N.J. 1981). In that sense, most of the disclosures required by the securities
laws generally pertain to matters having a direct bearing on the investor's eco-
nomic self-interest See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State
Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act 21 CASE W. REs. L REv. 722,
733 (1970).
178. The offeror must disclose its background, identity, and financial state-
ments, the source and amount of funds offered, and the future plans for the
target. See Exchange Act §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1982);
Schedule 141-1, Rule 14d-100, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1984).
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the offeror's acquisition of control. In other words, an offer
perceived to be harmful to the insurer might cause the share-
holder to accept what otherwise would have been a less than
desirable price, thereby improving the chances of the takeover
bid. The future of the insurer is thus dependent on the share-
holders' compensation, not the policyholders' needs.179
Invalidation of the state insurance takeover statutes, there-
fore, leaves policyholders unprotected against an injurious take-
over of the insurer. To a certain extent, other insurance
statutes may deter some of the prejudicial effect of an adverse
tender offer, if not the takeover itself. For example, the Model
Act declares in general terms that transactions between the in-
surer and affiliates must be fair and reasonable. 80 It also pro-
vides that notice of an insurer's extraordinary dividends or
distributions must be submitted in advance to the insurance
commissioner.S.1 These after-the-fact regulations, however, are
insufficient to furnish the desired level of policyholder protec-
tion. Although these regulations can avoid some abuses by the
new management, they cannot anticipate all of them. 8 2 In the
Baldwin-United disaster, for example, such regulation of trans-
actions between affiliates in an insurance holding company
failed to prevent abuses leading to the biggest insurance failure
in history. 8 3 The large number of state proceedings seeking
179. Undoubtedly, some shareholders will refuse to tender because of con-
cerns about the offer's future impact on the target. To assume that any more
than a relative handful will react in this manner, however, contradicts the un-
derlying and patently sensible assumption of the securities laws that investors
act in their own economic self-interest. See supra note 177 and accompanying
text. The resulting irony is that, given an adequate offering price, the more
harmful a takeover is, the more likely it is that it will succeed.
180. MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 5(a)(1).
181. Id § 5(c).
182. For example, the monitoring of transactions among affiliates in an in-
surance holding company system could not prevent a holding company from
curtailing its insurance subsidiary's underwritings or from slowly but deliber-
ately siphoning off the insurer's assets over an extended period of time. See
Note, supra note 76, at 661 n.170. The Connecticut Insurance Commissioner's
original disapproval of the merger between ITT and Hartford implicitly "rec-
ognized that once a merger was consummated there could be no guarantee
that funds would not be diverted from insurance or that the state's insurance
laws would not be circumvented." Id. at 661.
183. In this fiasco, Baldwin-United Corporation's announcement that it in-
tended to finance another acquisition with funds earned by its insurance sub-
sidiaries through annuity sales triggered an unscheduled examination of three
insurance subsidiaries domiciled in Arkansas. In its examination, the Arkan-
sas Insurance Department uncovered a $280 million shortfall in the invest-
ment portfolio supporting the value of the annuities. The investigation
revealed that the shortfall resulted from the investment of a portion of the
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the rehabilitation or liquidation of insurers that are insolvent
or have surplus that is impaired stands as a monument to the
inadequacies of financial regulation of insurers and the need for
some additional type of protection for policyholders.
IV. RESTORATION OF POLICYHOLDER PROTECTION:
POLICIES AND PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACTION
Despite the unconstitutionality of current state insurance
takeover statutes, the need to protect policyholders of target in-
surance companies remains. Unfortunately, this is a need that
the Williams Act was not designed to address. Several routes,
however, are potentially available for reviving state protection
of policyholders in a manner that does not impermissibly con-
flict with the federal regulatory scheme.
A. PoLicIEs DEMANDING RESTORATION
Policyholders obviously need and deserve regulatory pro-
tection from tender offers that may threaten their security.
They obviously have a real and legitimate interest in the future
of their insurer. A "worst case" scenario suggests a successful
offeror stripping the insurer of its liquid assets, leaving no sur-
plus or reserves for the protection of policyholders. An offeror
that is incompetent to manage an insurer or one that impru-
dently expands the insurer's operation, however, equally may
threaten the policyholders' security. In either situation, the in-
portfolio in substantially overvalued securities of the Baldwin-United subsidi-
aries. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 6. Obviously, the postacquisition fi-
nancial regulations were ineffective to avert this major catastrophe. At least
one insurance regulator stated that the fault lay in no small part with this af-
ter-the-fact type of regulation. Id. at 14, col. 2.
Apparently, the preacquisition review presumably performed by the com-
missioner also failed to avoid this problem. This Article does not suggest that
preacquisition regulation is a panacea but only that financial regulations ap-
plied after the takeover are by themselves inadequate. See Dew, supra note
12, at 105 (noting that "despite what detractors argue, the tools available to [in-
surance] regulators after a change in control has occurred simply are not as
efficient as those direct and indirect benefits inherent in a prior approval
scheme"). But see National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906,
911-12 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (suggesting that postacquisition regulation is fully ef-
fective without prior approval), affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1982); Langevoort, supra note 152, at 252 n.254 (preferable for states to protect
policyholders directly by attacking insurance company abuse rather than indi-
rectly by regulating tender offers); Silberman, Kezsbom & Sacks, supra note
101, at 473 (state regulatory powers fully effective to protect valid state
interests).
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sureds are powerless to protect their interests. They must sim-
ply sit on the sidelines and observe the tender offer, the
outcome of which may have a profound effect on their future.
And none of the contestants, including the offeror, target man-
agement, and shareholders, are necessarily concerned with the
policyholders' interests.184
The vulnerability of policyholders is the justification for in-
surance regulation generally. It does not make sense to main-
tain substantial regulatory protections in all other facets of the
policyholders' relationship with the insurer but abandon policy-
holders in a tender offer. When insurers are first incorporated
or granted a certificate of authority to transact business in a
state, the state usually does not rely exclusively on limitations
on the insurer's manner of conducting business. Instead, the
commissioner often has the right of prior approval. 1 85 The pub-
lic and the policyholders are entitled to no less protection in
the event of a tender offer for control of an insurer.
The rejection of the insurance takeover statutes as incom-
patible with the Williams Act does not constitute a rejection of
their underlying purpose of policyholder protection.186 Fortu-
nately, despite the incompatibility of the state statutes and the
Williams Act in their present form, the coexistence of regula-
tory protections for both policyholders and shareholders is not
a theoretical inconsistency. Indeed, many federal statutes gov-
erning acquisitions of control of federally regulated industries
protect interests similar to those of policyholders. 8 7 Whether
184. When confronted with a bid for control, management probably will
act in its own self-interest. In this sense, management may be no more protec-
tive of the policyholder's interests than are the offeror or shareholders, despite
management's duty to avoid actions adverse to these interests.
185. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 1106 (McKinney 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, §§ 616, 2107 (West 1976).
186. See Note, supra note 12, at 284. Even courts finding that the insurance
takeover laws do not regulate the "business of insurance," and are therefore
outside the purview of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, recognize the importance
of policyholder protection. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F.
Supp. 906, 910-12 (W.D. Mo. 1981), affd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th
Cir. 1982).
187. See, e.g., Federal Savings and Loan Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730a (1982); Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982); Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 797-808 (1982); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-
2151 (1982); Federal Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 835 (1982); Federal Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1982); Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378
(1982); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11,343 (1982). For a discussion of
the interrelationship between federal banking and securities laws, see Pitts &
Cranmore, Considerations Under the Federal Banking and Securities Laws
with Respect to Bank Mergers or Takeovers, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 789 (1983).
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their objective is the safety of airline passengersSS or the secur-
ity of bank depositors, 8 9 these statutes are structured to safe-
guard persons who otherwise are vulnerable and without a
voice during a tender offer contest. Each empowers the regula-
tor to convene a hearing, to consider the substantive merits and
impact of the acquisition, and to delay consummation pending
decision,190 thereby frustrating the "market approach" embod-
ied by the Williams Act.191
These federal- statutes, which bear a strong resemblance to
state insurance takeover acts, are enforced regardless of their
inconsistency with the Williams Act. At least with respect to
federal statutes, therefore, conflicting requirements are toler-
ated when circumstances indicate that the protection of share-
holders provided by the Williams Act is insufficient to protect
other deserving parties. 9 2 The tolerance of these federal stat-
188. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1378 (1982).
189. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982).
190. See statutes cited supra note 187. The SEC has indicated that it is not
disturbed by these differences because the statutes condition the acquisition of
control, but not the commencement of the tender offer, on regulatory ap-
proval. See Release No. 34-16,384, supra note 51, at 70,330, reprinted in [1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,584. The bank-
ing regulators appear to have accepted this rationale for reconciliation of their
regulation. See Pitts & Cranmore, supra note 187, at 808 & n.120 (citing RE-
PORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE CHANGE IN BANK CONTROL Acr OF 1978, OF-
FICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CuRRENcY 2 (Mar. 9, 1981)). In this respect
the federal statutes are unlike the state insurance laws, which prohibit the ini-
tiation of the offer, not just its consummation, before regulatory approval. See
supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
The "conditional offer" approach of these federal statutes, however, elimi-
nates only the conflict with Rule 14d-2(b); it does not relieve the inconsisten-
cies with the policy of the Williams Act. These statutes all permit substantial
postponement of the acquisition of control. For certain acquisitions of control
of rail carriers, the Interstate Commerce Act provides for published notice
within 30 days, completion of evidentiary hearings within 24 months of such
publication, and final decision by the Commission no later than 180 days after
the conclusion of the hearing. See 49 U.S.C. § 11,345(a), (b) (1982). The Bank
Holding Company Act permits the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to
make a decision as late as 151 days after the initial application plus the time
required for the hearing itself, with no limit on the duration of the hearing.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a), (b) (1982). Approvals of acquisitions of control under
the Federal Aviation Act are not constrained by any statutory deadline. See 49
U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1982). The substantial delays in the offer's consummation
made poisible by these federal statutes add considerably to the arsenal of the
target's management and can be just as detrimental to the offeror as statutes
delaying the offer's commencement. Consequently, these statutes upset the
careful balance of neutrality between offeror and management constructed by
the Williams Act. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
192. These federal statutes, of course, do not face the constitutional impedi-
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utes demonstrates the compatibility of protective policies, such
as the goal of protecting policyholders, with the shareholder
protection objective underlying the Williams Act.
Arguably, however, the intent of Congress to have the Wil-
liams Act regulate insurance takeovers precludes state laws
protecting policyholders even if those laws do not conflict with
other policies and provisions of the Williams Act. By its ex-
press terms, the Williams Act extends to tender offers for and
acquisitions of, inter alia, "any equity security of an insurance
company which would have been required to be so registered
[under section 12 of the Exchange Act] except for the exemp-
tion contained in section 781 (g)(2)(G).' u 93 This provision can be
interpreted to require supremacy clause preemption of all state
regulation of insurance company tender offers, including regu-
lations securing policyholder protections. Although such an in-
terpretation is reasonable if the Act's language is taken at face
value, it is negated by the legislative history of the provision.
As originally enacted in 1968, the Williams Act applied
only to tender offers for securities registered pursuant to sec-
tion 12 of the Exchange Act.194 In 1964, Congress had ex-
empted insurers from section 12 registration, and thus from the
Exchange Act's disclosure, proxy, and insider trading provi-
sions, if the domiciliary state provided adequate regulation in
those areas.1 95 Thus, the Williams Act originally did not apply
ments posed by the commerce and supremacy clauses. Whether inconsistency
with the Williams Act affects the enforceability of these federal statutes is, in-
stead, a matter of statutory construction. It certainly is incongruous, however,
to allow these regulatory statutes to continue to operate while simultaneously
invalidating the similar insurance laws simply because the former are federal
acts and the latter are state acts. This result approaches the point of absurdity
in view of Congress's delegation to the states of its power over insurance in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
193. Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see also id.
§ 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (extending reporting requirements to pur-
chasers who become five percent beneficial owners of insurance company
stock).
194. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, sec. 3, Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 82
Stat. 454, 456 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) (1982)).
195. See Securities Acts Amendment of 1964, sec. 3(c), Exchange Act
§ 12(g)(2)(G), Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 567-68 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g)(2)(G) (1982)). The objective of the exemption was to avoid multiple
regulation by the state and federal governments and to conform to "the doc-
trine embodied in the McCarran Act that the regulation of insurance compa-
nies be left to the States." H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3013, 3022. This objective was
echoed during the House and Senate floor debates. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC.
17,917 (1964) (statement of Rep. Harris); id at 17,921-22 (statement of Rep.
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to tender offers for the securities of insurers domiciled in states
having such regulation. At the behest of insurers fearful of
takeovers,196 however, Congress amended the Williams Act in
1970 to include the specific language covering acquisitions of
control of insurers.19 7
The legislative history of the 1970 amendments suggests
that Congress's motivation in broadening the coverage of the
Williams Act was not to repudiate the policy embodied in the
1964 amendments of giving states the primary responsibility to
regulate insurance security transactions, but rather to fill a reg-
ulatory void caused by a lack of state regulation of insurance
takeovers. 98 The specific reference in the Williams Act to
tender offers for insurance company securities, therefore, does
not represent a policy declaration that only federal regulation
can adequately deal with such offers. Rather, the proliferation
of state insurance takeover statutes extinguishes the reason un-
derlying this language.199 Indeed, the policy embodied in the
1964 amendments of allowing states to regulate certain securi-
ties law matters supports the view that the states should have
Springs); id. at 18,183 (statement of Rep. Pickle); id. at 18,383 (statement of
Sen. Javits).
196. See Weilder, Regulation of the Insurance Industry Under the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, 7 CoNN. L. REv. 711, 718 (1975).
197. See Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. 91-567, sec. 3, Exchange Act
§ 14(d)(1), 84 Stat. 1497, 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982)).
198. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee explained:
The bill does not seek to disturb the decision reached in 1964 to leave
periodic reporting, proxy solication and regulation of insider trading
with respect to securities of insurance companies to the appropriate
State authorities. However, in view of the nationwide basis of most
tender offers and the fact that such offers are not presently regulated
by State insurance commissioners, it appears appropriate to the com-
mittee to bring within the purview of sections 13(d) and 14(d) acquisi-
tions of insurance company securities.
S. REP. No. 1125, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5025, 5027 (emphasis added). Practically identical explanations for
the adoption of the 1970 amendments appear in the House Interstate and For-
eign Commerce Committee report, H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5025, 5027, and the comments
of the principal congressional architect of the original legislation, 116 CONG.
REC. 29,252 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams).
199. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted the
Model Act in 1969, one year before Congress amended the Williams Act.
Within a matter of years, almost every state adopted some sort of regulation
governing the acquisition of control of insurers. See supra notes 11-13 and ac-
companying text. Since these statutes generally favor the target insurer more
than does the Williams Act, see supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text, it is
doubtful whether those insurers that originally recommended the extension of
federal regulation to insurance takeovers would do so today.
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the primary responsibility for insurance takeovers.200
The absence of any policy disfavoring state protection of
policyholders in a tender offer is confirmed indirectly by sev-
eral additional sources. First, the Federal Securities Code, pro-
posed by the American Law Institute and endorsed by the
Securities and Exchange Comnission, 201 would expressly pre-
empt any state law regulating tender offers or takeover bids
"that is not limited to a regulated industry."20 2 Since insurance
takeover statutes are so limited,20 3 they fall within the preemp-
tion exception. The inclusion of this exemption from an other-
wise all-encompassing preemption implicitly recognizes that
reasonable state regulation of insurance takeovers is justified
and should continue despite conflicts with the pattern of fed-
eral regulation.20 4
Second, the report of the SEC Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers broadly endorsed state regulation of tender of-
fers for insurers.20 5 Recommendation 9(c) states:
200. In 1970, the SEC questioned whether individual states could ade-
quately regulate nationwide tender offers and, on that basis, distinguished
tender offer regulation from those securities matters left to the states under
the 1964 amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted
in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5025, 5032-33. Throughout the ensuing
debate over federal versus state regulation of general business takeovers, how-
ever, the power of the state to regulate the transaction was not doubted except
in the constitutional sense. The power of an insurance commissioner should
certainly be no less than that of a state corporation commissioner or secretary
of state.
201. See Exchange Act Release No. 17,153, reprinted in [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,655 (Sept. 18, 1980) (announcing Com-
mission's support of Federal Securities Code); Exchange Act Release No.
18,437, reprinted in [1981-1982 Trahsfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
83,090 (Jan. 21, 1982) (reaffirming support of Code).
202. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1904(c)(1) (1978).
203. See id. § 1904(c) comment 10(c).
204. There is some ambiguity about whether § 1904(c)(1) would completely
avoid preemption of the state insurance takeover statutes. Section 1904(j)(1)
states that "except as provided in sections 917(a) and (b), 1819(j)(7), 1904(a) to
(e) inclusive, and 1906, nothing in this Code (as defined in section 202(24)) af-
fects the application of State law to any security, transaction, or person to the
extent that it does not conflict with this Code (as so defined)." Id. § 19040)(1).
This provision could be interpreted to mean that state insurance provisions,
like any other state laws, are still subject to preemption to the extent they
conflict with the Code because § 1904(c) does not expressly preempt such pro-
visions. This result, however, would render the exemption from express pre-
emption meaningless; inconsistencies between the Code and state regulation of
tender offers are inevitable. The Code should be interpreted to tolerate the
state insurance laws despite their conflict with the Code's regulation of tender
offers.
205. See SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF REC-
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Federal takeover regulation should not preempt substantive state
regulation of banks, utilities, insurance companies and similar busi-
nesses, where the change of control provisions of such state regulation
are justified in relation to the overall objectives of the industry being
regulated, do not conflict with the procedural provisions of federal
takeover regulation and relate to a significant portion of the issuer's
business.20
6
Moreover, Recommendation 34 recognizes that despite the bur-
dens on interstate dommerce that often result from state take-
over statutes, such statutes are nonetheless justified in certain
regulated industries when vital to the interests that state regu-
lation was intended to protect.207
Third, Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel of the SEC, has
recognized the unique policies underlying statutes governing
takeovers of regulated businesses such as insurance. In an Au-
gust 6, 1984, program sponsored by the ABA Committee on
State Regulation of Securities, Mr. Goelzer indicated that these
statutes are valid even after Edgar if they affect traditional ar-
eas of state concern and are narrowly drawn to avoid unneces-
sarily burdening interstate commerce. 208
OMMENDATIONS (July 8, 1983), reprinted in REPRESENTING PUBLICLY TRADED
CORPORATIONS, 1984, at -667 (Corp. L..& .Prac. Course Handbook Series, no.
447) (K_ Eppler & T. Gilroy, cochairmen 1984) [hereinafter cited as REPRE-
SENTING PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS].
206. Id. Recommendation 9(c), at 18, reprinted in REPRESENTING PUBLICLY
TRADED CORPORATIONS, supra note 205, at 669.
207. Specifically, Recommendation 34 jrovides:
State laws and regulations, regardless of their form, that restrict
the ability of a company to make a tender offer should not be permit-
ted because they constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Included in this category should be statutes that prohibit completion
of a tender offer without target company shareholder approval and
broad policy legislation'written so as to impair the ability to transfer
corporate control in a manner and time frame consistent with the fed-
eral tender offer process.
An exception to this basic prohibition may be appropriate where
a significant portion of the target company is in a regulated industry
and where special change of control provisions are vital to the
achievement of ends for which the industry is regulated.
Id. Recommendation 34, at 35-36, reprinted in REPRESENTING PUBLICuY
TRADED CORPORATIONS, supra note 205, at 673.
The SEC concurs with Recommendations 9(c) and 34. See Takeover Tac-
tics and Public Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunication,
Consumer Protection, anld Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 23, 34-35 (1984) (statement of John Shad, SEC
Chairman), reprinted in REPRESENTING PUBICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS,
supra note 205, at 680, 690, 701-02.
208. See 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1394, 1394-95 (August 17, 1984)
(containing a brief summary of the statements of the various panelists at the
meeting). Mr. Goelzer introduced his remarks with the usual disclaimer that
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These three sources all indicate that states can continue to
regulate insurance takeovers, but their analysis does not over-
come the constitutional infirmities of the insurance statutes or
reconcile the state statutes with the Williams Act. Instead, the
conclusion of each apparently is based on an acknowledgement
that the statutes should survive notwithstanding minor discrep-
ancies with the federal regulatory scheme because they provide
essential protections that are unavailable elsewhere. The
message of these sources, therefore, is that policyholders need
and deserve protection and should not be abandoned simply be-
cause of an inconsistent federal regulation designed for an en-
tirely different purpose.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Several different avenues of legislative reform are avail-
able to restore policyholder protection in tender offers.
Although some possible revisions of present law are either un-
realistic or too simplistic to provide any appreciable protection,
others provide an acceptable balance between the federal inter-
est in shareholder protection and the state goal of policyholder
protection.
.1. Abridge State Statutes to Avoid Conflict with the Williams
Act
The least complicated method of preserving the constitu-
tionality of state insurance takeover statutes is to excise those
provisions conflicting with the Williams Act.20 9 Although this
approach avoids the consitutional infirmities of these statutes,
it also removes all semblance of their policyholder protections.
Without a hearing on the effect of the takeover on the insurer's
policyholders or the insurance commissioner's independent re-
view of the offer's merits, the takeover statutes would be re-
duced to mere disclosure statutes. Because policyholders have
he was not speaking for the Commission. During the same program, which,
incidentally, the author attended, Mr. Robert M. Royalty, of the Atlanta office
of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, concluded that state takeover statutes per-
taining to regulated industries, particularly the insurance statutes, were le-
gally in good shape despite Edgar.
209. Several states attempted to preserve their general business takeover
statutes in this manner. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 13.34[2] (rev. 1984); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKE-
OVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 5.02[4][d] (1984); Sargent, supra note 144, at 708-12;
Veasey, State Takeover Statutes, 13 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. (PLI) 85, 87
(1981).
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no power to accept or reject the offer, disclosure to policyhold-
ers is ineffective to protect their interests.
2 10
The state legislatures could attempt to rectify this flaw by
coupling the disclosure requirements with provisions empower-
ing policyholders to participate in the offer. In an effort to save
their general business takeover statutes, for example, some
states now require that offers first be submitted to a share-
holder vote if the offeror could acquire a defined percentage of
the target's outstanding securities.2 1 ' Similarly, the insurance
takeover statutes could require that an offer be approved by a
vote of policyholders before consummation. Unfortunately,
however, although this approach theoretically eliminates the
need for a hearing and commissioner review by giving the poli-
cyholders the ability to protect their own interests, it would not
adequately protect policyholders. For the most part, policy-
holders are not investors and, as a group, cannot be expected to
possess the necessary business and financial acumen to use the
required disclosures to evaluate the implications of the offer.
Unlike shareholders, who assume the risk of investment deci-
sions, policyholders do not intend to undertake an investment
risk by purchasing a policy. Indeed, they purchase the policy to
avoid, rather than assume, risk. To force ill-prepared policy-
holders into these investment decisions would seriously under-
mine the public's confidence in the ability of the insurance
industry to assure future security. Policyholders simply require
a more paternalistic type of regulatory protection than do
shareholders.
2. Permit Conditional Offers
Another alternative would be to amend the state statutes
to expressly permit an offer conditioned on regulatory ap-
proval.212 The statutes then would be indistinguishable from
210. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
211. Ohio was the first state to adopt this approach, see Act of Nov. 19,
1982, § 1, 1983 Ohio Legis. Bull. 1, 3-4, 8-9 (Anderson) (codified at Omio REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 170L01(Z), .831 (Page Supp. 1983)), and Wisconsin has enacted a
similar provision, see Act of Apr. 18, 1984, No. 200, §§ 7(3), (4)(b), 1984 Wis.
Legis. Serv. 1789, 1790-91 (West) (codified at Wis STAT. ANN. §§ 180.69(3),
(4)(b) (West Supp. 1984)), although both statutes permit waiver of this require-
ment in the issuer's articles or regulations. See generally Kreider, Fortress
Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L REv. 108, 119-23
(1983) (no safe prediction regarding constitutionality of Ohio takeover statute);
Profusek & Gompf, supra note 7, at 31-36 (Ohio-type statute probably constitu-
tional because it does not expressly or implicitly conflict with federal law).
212. Most state insurance laws now require that the regulatory approval
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federal laws with which the SEC has anticipated no conflict. 213
As noted earlier, however, the conditional offer format still
would conflict with the policies underlying the Williams Act.
By permitting substantial delays in the consummation of the of-
fer, the hearing and regulatory approval provisions upset the
Act's balance of neutrality between the offeror and incumbent
management.21 4 By itself, therefore, an amendment permitting
conditional offers will not avoid the statutes' preemption.
3. Exempt State-Regulated Insurance Takeovers from the
Williams Act
A more effective approach would be to amend the Williams
Act to exclude from its scope tender offers for control of insur-
ers when state insurance laws already regulate such offers.
This amendment would not simply return the Act to the status
quo existing before the 1970 amendments extended its coverage
to tender offers for insurance company securities.21 5 Instead, it
would exempt offers for insurance company securities only
when the offer itself is regulated by state insurance laws.216
The Williams Act still would apply to insurers domiciled in
states that do not regulate such offers and to offers that would
not result in transfer of control of the insurer. Such an amend-
ment would be a better resolution than the other alternatives
described above because an express exception in the Williams
Act would eliminate any danger of preemption. If Congress
specifically authorizes a contradictory scheme under state law,
it can hardly be said that the state law frustrates congressional
purposes and objectives.
Even this solution, however, is not ideal because, in the
guise of restoring policyholder protection, it also places insur-
ance company shareholder protection in the hands of the states.
Although the states may be better able than the federal govern-
ment to appreciate and protect the interests of policyholders,
there is no reason to believe that they are as well-equipped to
deal with shareholder protection. This problem is magnified in
precede commencement, not just consummation, of the offer. See supra notes
145-46 and accompanying text.
213. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-16,384, supra note 51, at 70,330, re-
printed in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at
82,584.
214. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
216. In this respect, the suggested amendment is similar to the 1964
amendments discussed supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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the case of a tender offer for an insurance holding company
rather than for the insurer itself. The protection of policyhold-
ers of the subsidiary insurer is still a legitimate state concern
because of the potential transfer of control of the insurer, but
beyond that it is difficult to justify state insurance department
intervention in the conduct of a tender offer for the shares of a
noninsurer.
4. Divide Responsibilities Between State and Federal
Regulators
The best resolution is to divide between state and federal
agencies the regulatory responsibilities relating to the acquisi-
tion of control of an insurer. Protection of insurers' policyhold-
ers would remain with the states, but shareholders of the
insurer would continue to be protected by the Williams Act
and, to the extent possible, be treated the same as shareholders
in other corporate takeovers. In other words, both regulatory
schemes would operate simultaneously. This result, of course,
requires action from both the state legislatures and Congress.
On the state level, the insurance takeover statutes should
be amended to delete provisions designed exclusively for share-
holder protection,217 including those provisions not mentioning
shareholders but that nevertheless are solely intended to pro-
tect shareholder interests.2 1 8 In addition, the remaining provi-
sions should be tailored to diminish interference with the
Williams Act. Statutes that reach foreign insurers having sig-
nificant contacts with the state219 should be amended to apply
only to domestic insurers in order to minimize the potential for
217. This modification would result in no protection for target corporation
shareholders when the target insurer's equity securities are not registered
under the 1934 Act. When the target insurer has neither securities listed on a
national securities exchange nor 500 shareholders and $3 million in assets,
tender offers for its securities are not governed by the Williams Act. See Ex-
change Act §§ 12(g)(1), 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g)(1), 78n(d)(1) (1982); Rule
12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1984). The suggested amendment therefore would
leave shareholders totally unprotected in such offers unless the state business
takeover law applied. To avoid this omission, the state insurance or corporate
laws could be amended further to extend takeover regulation to these offers.
Since Congress did not think it necessary to extend Williams Act protection to
shareholders of smaller, unregistered general business corporations, however,
perhaps there is no need for states to provide comparable protection to share-
holders of smaller, unregistered insurers.
218. See MODEL ACM, supra note 11, § 3(b)(9), (11); supra note 82 and ac-
companying text.
219. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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duplicative state proceedings. 220 Instead of permitting all af-
fected parties to intervene,221 state statutes should give them
the limited right to file amicus curiae memoranda with the
commissioner. The timetable for commencement of the public
hearing and for the commissioner's decision should be expe-
dited to reduce delays, which inevitably favor those opposed to
the offer.222 The hearing itself, which presently does not have
a completion deadline under the Model Act and many state
statutes, 223 should be given a maximum duration. The entire
process should have a deadline of sixty days to enable an of-
feror receiving a favorable decision from the commissioner to
commence purchasing tendered shares before the shareholders'
withdrawal right matures. 224
220. The Model Act already contains some provisions that minimize its in-
terference with the Williams Act. For example, it allows the offeror to use its
federal disclosure statements to the extent that they contain information re-
quired by the Model Act, thereby avoiding delay in the preparation of duplica-
tive disclosures. See MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(c). Also, the definition of
"domestic insurer" includes an insurance holding company only if it is primar-
ily engaged in the business of insurance. See id. § 3(a)(1). Consequently, ac-
quisition of an insurance holding company is not subject to the Act if the
insurance business constitutes only a relatively small portion of the target's
overall enterprise.
221. See, e.g., MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(d)(2).
222. The Model Act currently requires the commissioner to give the of-
feror at least 20 days' notice of the hearing. See MODEL ACT, supra note 11,
§ 3(d)(2). Since the offeror should anticipate the hearing in any event, this no-
tice period seems clearly excessive. On the other hand, shortening the notice
period should be tempered by the realization that the opportunity for effective
discovery also will be reduced. For a sampling of existing timetables for com-
mencement and decision, see supra note 153.
223. See, e.g., MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 3(d)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-
3(f) (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3304(d) (Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 500.1315(2) (West 1983); MINN. STAT. § 60D.02(4)(2) (1984); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 692C.210 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-5A-10, -12 (1978).
224. The Williams Act permits shareholders to withdraw shares that have
been tendered but not yet purchased at any time after 60 days from the date
the offer was commenced. See Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1982). Because federal law thus permits the offeror to hold tendered shares
for that period of time, a state proceeding completed within 60 days does not
intrude significantly into the operation of the federal scheme. New York has
taken a step to minimize conflict with the Williams Act by amending its gen-
eral business takeover law to provide that an attorney general's temporary or-
der prohibiting the offeror from purchasing any tendered shares cannot
extend longer than 55 days after filing of the registration statement. See Act
of June 30, 1980, ch. 733, sec. 2, § 1605(b), 1980 N.Y. Laws 1869, 1869 (codified
at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1605(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985)). Even with
such an amendment, however, some conflicts with the rules promulgated
under the Williams Act remain. The rules, for example, permit the offeror to
begin purchasing tendered shares within 20 days. See Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R.
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On the federal level, Congress could amend the Williams
Act to provide that it does not preempt state statutes protecting
policyholders, but not shareholders, in connection with any of-
fer for or acquisition of control of an insurer. Although this di-
vision makes sense theoretically, it would provoke controversy
over whether the state statute provides only policyholder, and
no shareholder, protections. Such ambiguity undoubtedly
would encourage incumbent management threatened with a
hostile offer to litigate this issue with vigor and thereby create
further delay. Furthermore, this amendment would have to
contain a specific and easily applied definition of control in or-
der to identify the insurance statutes it exempts and avoid addi-
tional delay in litigating that issue.22
To avert these interpretive difficulties, Congress instead
should adopt a more clear-cut amendment to the Williams Act
stating that offers for insurers or insurance holding companies
that are conditioned on state regulatory approval by the insur-
ance commissioner of the insurer's domiciliary state are permis-
sible and not preempted by the Act.226 It should further
specify, however, that the Williams Act and the rules promul-
gated thereunder continue to apply to such offers to the extent
that they do not interfere with the insurance regulator's re-
sponsibilities under state law. This amendment would allow
states to enforce their policyholder protections while retaining
the essentials of the Williams Act for shareholder protection.
It assumes, of course, cooperation by the states in narrowing
their takeover statutes as suggested above to concentrate solely
on policyholder protection and to reduce conflicts with the Wil-
liams Act.227 For instance, state insurance laws would have to
be modified to require that consummation, but not commence-
ment, of offers be delayed pending regulatory approval.2 8
§ 240.14e-1(a) (1984). Such minor conflicts should be tolerated, however, to al-
low states to perform their traditional function of policyholder protection.
225. The amendment could be patterned after the insurance holding com-
pany acts, which often presume "control" if the offeror could acquire 10% of
the target's outstanding shares. See MODEL Acr, supra note 11, § 1(c); statutes
cited supra note 15. Such a presumption, however, would not preclude dila-
tory litigation over whether the presumption is rebutted in an individual case.
226. This amendment would overcome the obstacles to the "conditional of-
fer" format caused by the Williams Act goal of neutrality and its market ap-
proach. See supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text. Delay in the
consummation of an offer cannot frustrate federal law when Congress ex-
pressly authorizes the delay.
227. See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
228. As presently worded, the Model Act and most state holding company
acts prohibit making an offer before approval by the insurance commissioner.
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Allowing the Williams Act and the state insurance take-
over statutes to operate simultaneously to achieve the goals of
each clearly is a compromise. As a result, it would, to a certain
degree, impair the effectiveness of both regulatory schemes and
undermine the carefully constructed neutrality of the Williams
Act. It also would reduce the state insurance commissioner's
opportunity to make a scrupulous, unhurried determination fol-
lowing a hearing. Nevertheless, this solution protects both
shareholders and policyholders. Shareholders would receive
the information necessary to make an informed decision, and
the policyholders' security would be safeguarded by the com-
missioner's independent review.229
Conclusion
Despite their legitimate purpose of policyholder protection,
state laws regulating the acquisition of control of domestic in-
surers are preempted by the Williams Act and thus are uncon-
stitutional under the supremacy clause. This result, however, is
not dictated by a federal policy against policyholder protection
but only by the conflicts in the operation of the two bodies of
law. The present state of the law therefore creates the entirely
unintended result of abandoning policyholder interests when
control of the insurer is transferred. Federal and state authori-
ties should put aside their parochial concerns and divide the
regulatory responsibilities with respect to takeovers in order to
restore protection for policyholders while preserving it for
shareholders.
See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. The amendment should re-
quire, not just permit, conditional offers so as to preclude offerors from precip-
itating a constitutional confrontation between state and federal law by making
an unconditional offer. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
229. The greatest obstacle to the proposed solution is its complexity. It re-
quires numerous, thoughtful amendments to both the Williams Act and the
state insurance takeover laws. Its success, therefore, demands cooperative ac-
tion by Congress and 50 state legislatures. Given the improbability of that
level of collaboration, a more realistic though less desirable alternative may be
simply to exclude insurance takeovers from the Williams Act. See supra notes
215-16 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX*
Section 3. Acquisition of Control of or Merger with Domestic
Insurer
(a) Filing Requirements. No person other than the issuer
shall make a tender offer for or a request or invitation
for tenders of, or enter into any agreement to exchange
securities for, seek to acquire, or acquire, in the open
market or otherwise, any voting security of a domestic
insurer if, after the consummation thereof, such person
would, directly or indirectly (or by conversion or by ex-
ercise of any right to acquire) be in control of such in-
surer, and no person shall enter into an agreement to
merge with or otherwise to acquire control of a domes-
tic insurer unless, at the time any such offer, request,
or invitation is made or any such agreement is entered
into, or prior to the acquisition of such securities if no
offer or agreement is involved, such person has filed
with the Commissioner and has sent to such insurer,
and such insurer has sent to its shareholders, a state-
ment containing the information required by this sec-
tion and such offer, request, invitation, agreement or
acquisition has been approved by the Commissioner in
the manner hereinafter prescribecd
(1) For purposes of this section: a domestic insurer
shall include any other person controlling a do-
mestic insurer unless such other person is either
directly or through its affiliates primarily engaged
in business other than the business of insurance.
(b) Content of Statement The statement to be filed with
the Commissioner hereunder shall be made under oath
or affirmation and shall contain the following
information:
(1) The name and address of each person by whom or
on whose behalf the merger or other acquisition of
control referred to in subsection (a) is to be ef-
fected (hereinafter called "acquiring party"), and
(i) if such person is an individual, his principal
occupation and all offices and positions held
during the past five years, and any conviction
of crimes other than minor traffic violations
during the past ten years;
* MODEL Acr, supm note 11, § 3.
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(ii) if such person is not an individual, a report of
the nature of its business operations during
the past five years or for such lesser period as
such person and any predecessors thereof
shall have been in existence; an informative
description of the business intended to be
done by such person and such person's sub-
sidiaries; and a list of all individuals who are
or who have been selected to become direc-
tors or executive officers of such person, or
who perform or will perform functions appro-
priate to such positions. Such list shall in-
clude for each such individual the
information required by paragraph (i) of this
subsection.
(2) The source, nature and amount of the considera-
tion used or to be used in effecting the merger or
other acquisition of control, a description of any
transaction wherein funds were or are to be ob-
tained for any such purpose, and the identity of
persons furnishing such consideration, provided,
however, that where a source of such considera-
tion is a loan made in the lender's ordinary course
of business, the identity of the lender shall remain
confidential, if the person filing such statement so
requests.
(3) Fully audited financial information as to the earn-
ings and financial condition of each acquiring
party for the preceding five fiscal years of each
such acquiring party (or for such lesser period as
such acquiring party and any predecessors thereof
shall have been in existence), and similar
unaudited information as of a date not earlier
than 90 days prior to the filing of the statement.
(4) Any plans or proposals which each acquiring party
may have to liquidate such insurer, to sell its as-
sets or merge or consolidate it with any person, or
to make any other material change in its business
or corporate structure or management.
(5) The number of shares of any security referred to
in subsection (a) which each acquiring party pro-
poses to acquire, and the terms of the offer, re-
quest, invitation, agreement, or acquisition
referred to in subsection (a), and a statement as to
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the method by which the fairness of the proposal
was arrived at.
(6) The amount of each class of any security referred
to in subsection (a) which is beneficially owned or
concerning which there is a right to acquire bene-
ficial ownership by each acquiring party.
(7) A full description of any contracts, arrangements
or understandings with respect to any security re-
ferred to in subsection (a) in which any acquiring
party is involved, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures,
loan or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaran-
tees of loans, guarantees against loss or guarantees
of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giv-
ing or withholding of proxies. Such description
shall identify the persons with whom such con-
tracts, arrangements or understandings have been
entered into.
(8) A description of the purchase of any security re-
ferred to in subsection (a) during the twelve (12)
calendar months preceding the filing of the state-
ment, by any acquiring party, including the dates
of purchase, names of the purchasers, and consid-
eration paid or agreed to be paid therefor.
(9) A description of any recommendations to
purchase any security referred to in subsection (a)
made during the twelve (12) calendar months pre-
ceding the filing of the statement, by any acquir-
ing party, or by anyone based upon interviews or
at the suggestion of such acquiring party.
(10) Copies of all tender offers for, requests or invita-
tions for tenders of exchange offers for, and agree-
ments to acquire or exchange any securities
referred to in subsection (a), and (if distributed) of
additional soliciting material relating thereto.
(11) The terms of any agreement, contract or under-
standing made with any broker-dealer as to solici-
tation of securities referred to in subsection (a) for
tender, and the amount of any fees, commissions
or other compensation to be paid to broker-dealers
with regard thereto.
(12) Such additional information as the Commissioner
may by rule or regulation prescribe as necessary
or appropriate for the protection of policyholders
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and securityholders of the insurer or in the public
interest.
If the person required to file the statement referred to
in subsection (a) is a partnership, limited partnership,
syndicate or other group, the Commissioner may re-
quire that the information called for by clauses (1)
through (12) shall be given with respect to each partner
of such partnership or limited partnership, each mem-
ber of such syndicate or group, and each person who
controls such partner or member. If any such partner,
member or person is a corporation or the person re-
quired to file the statement referred to in subsection
(a) is a corporation, the Commissioner may require that
the information called for by clauses (1) through (12)
shall be given with respect to such corporation, each of-
ficer and director of such corporation, and each person
who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than ten (10) percent of the outstanding voting
securities of such corporation.
If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in
the statement filed with the Commissioner and sent to
such insurer pursuant to this section, an amendment
setting forth such change, together with copies of all
documents and other material relevant to such change,
shall be filed with the Commissioner and sent to such
insurer within two business days after the person
learns of such change. Such insurer shall send such
amendment to its shareholders.
(c) Alternative Filing Materials. If any offer, request, in-
vitation, agreement or acquisition referred to in subsec-
tion (a) is proposed to be made by means of a
registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933
or in circumstances requiring the disclosure of similar
information under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
or under a state law requiring similar registration or
disclosure, the person required to file the statement re-
ferred to in subsection (a) may utilize such documents
in furnishing the information called for by that
statement.
(d) Approval by Commissioner; Hearings.
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(1) The Commissioner shall approve any merger or
other acquisition of control referred to in subsec-
tion (a) unless, after a public hearing thereon, he
finds that:
(i) After the change of control the domestic in-
surer referred to in subsection (a) would not
be able to satisfy the requirements for the is-
suance of a license to write the line or lines
of insurance for which it is presently
licensed;
(ii) the effect of the merger or other acquisition
of control would be substantially to lessen
competition in insurance in this state or tend
to create a monopoly therein;
(iii) the financial condition of any acquiring party
is such as might jeopardize the financial sta-
bility of the insurer, or prejudice the interest
of its policyholders or the interests of any re-
maining security holders who are unaffiliated
with such acquiring party;
(iv) the terms of the offer, request, invitation,
agreement or acquisition referred to in sub-
section (a) are unfair and unreasonable to the
securityholders of the insurer;
(v) the plans or proposals which the acquiring
party has to liquidate the insurer, sell its as-
sets or consolidate or merge it with any per-
son, or to make any other material change in
its business or corporate structure or manage-
ment, are unfair and unreasonable to policy-
holders of the insurer and not in the public
interest; or
(vi) the competence, experience and integrity of
those persons who would control the opera-
tion of the insurer are such that it would not
be in the interest of policyholders of the in-
surer and of the public to permit the merger
or other acquisition of control.
(2) The public hearing referred to in clause (1) shall
be held within 30 days after the statement re-
quired by subsection (a) is filed, and at least 20
days' notice thereof shall be given by the Commis-
sioner to the person filing the statement. Not less
than 7 days' notice of such public hearing shall be
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given by the person filing the statement to the in-
surer and to such other persons as may be desig-
nated by the Commissioner. The insurer shall
give such notice to its securityholders. The Com-
missioner shall make a determination within 30
days after the conclusion of such hearing. At such
hearing, the person filing the statement, the in-
surer, any person to whom notice of hearing was
sent, and any other person whose interests may be
affected thereby shall have the right to present
evidence, examine and crossexamine witnesses,
and offer oral and written arguments and in con-
nection therewith shall be entitled to conduct dis-
covery proceedings in the same manner as is
presently allowed in the - Court of this
state. All discovery proceedings shall be con-
cluded not later than 3 days prior to the com-
mencement of the public hearing.
(e) Mailings to Shareholders; Payment of Expenses. All
statements, amendments, or other material filed pursu-
ant to subsection (a) or (b), and all notices of public
hearings held pursuant to subsection (d), shall be
mailed by the insurer to its shareholders within five
business days after the insurer has received such state-
ments, amendments, other material, or notices. The
expenses of mailing shall be borne by the person mak-
ing the filing. As security for the payment of such ex-
penses, such person shall file with the Commissioner
an acceptable bond or other deposit in an amount to be
determined by the Commissioner.
(f) Exemptions. The provisions of this section shall not
apply to:
(i) any offers, requests, invitations, agreements or ac-
quisitions by the person referred to in subsection
(a) of any voting security referred to in subsection
(a) which, immediately prior to the consummation
of such offer, request, invitation, agreement or ac-
quisition, was not issued and outstanding;
(ii) [any transaction which is subject to the provisions
of sections __ and - of the laws of this
state, dealing with the merger or consolidation of
two or more insurers;] 4
4. Optional for use in those states where existing law adequately governs
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(iii) Any offer, request, invitation, agreement or acqui-
sition which the Commissioner by order shall ex-
empt therefrom as (1) not having been made or
entered into for the purpose and not having the ef-
fect of changing or influencing the control of a do-
mestic insurer, or (2) as otherwise not
comprehended within the purposes of this Section.
(g) Violations. The following shall be violations of this
Section:
(i) The failure to file any statement, amendment, or
other material required to be filed pursuant to
subsection (a) or (b); or
(ii) the effectuation or any attempt to effectuate an ac-
quisition of control of, or merger with, a domestic
insurer unless the Commissioner has given his ap-
proval thereto.
(h) Jurisdiction,; Consent to Service of Process. The courts
of this State are hereby vested with jurisdiction over
every person not resident, domiciled, or authorized to
do business in this state who files a statement with the
Commissioner under this section, and over all actions
involving such person arising out of violations of this
section, and each such person shall be deemed to have
performed acts equivalent to and constituting an ap-
pointment by such a person of the Commissioner to be
his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served
all lawful process in any action, suit or proceeding aris-
ing out of violations of this section. Copies of all such
lawful process shall be served on the Commissioner
and transmitted by registered or certified mail by the
Commissioner to such person at his last known
address.
standards and procedures for the merger or consolidation of two or more
insurers.
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